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The End of Trial on Damages?
Intangible Losses and Comparability Review
JOELLEN LINDt
INTRODUCTION
There is a movement underway to dismantle the system
of tort compensation by attacking trial as the proper
institution to assess damages. Proponents of this movement
subscribe to the school of behavioral law and economics.
They argue that human irrationality justifies removing
decisions about damages from an overly populist trial
system.' The least radical of their suggestions is to shift
more power over damages from juries to judges;3 the most
radical is to substitute a system of technocratic expertise
t Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; A.B., Stanford
University; J.D., UCLA School of Law. I wish to thank Jonathan Weinberg for
the comments he made on this article; his questions concerning conceptual
difficulties with comparability review had a major impact on the final version of
my discussion. My colleague, Paul Brietzke, made invaluable contributions to
the more technical portions of the analysis. I am indebted to Douglas Laycock
as well, for introducing me to many of the cases and issues discussed here
through his excellent casebook on remedies. Finally, I wish to dedicate this
article to my daughter, Erin Lind Shencopp, J.D. University of Michigan School
of Law, 2003; our frequent discussions on law and economics, as well as other
policy questions, dramatically helped to crystallize my thinking.
1. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behaviorism Too Seriously? The
Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1907, 1908-09 (2002). For a catalog of some of the behavioralist
literature, see Donald D. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision-making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1499 (1998). For an example of one of the more influential statements of the
behavioral law and economics program, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed. 2000).
2. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L. J. 2071, 2079 [hereinafter
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages].
3. Id. at 2078-79.
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for trial altogether. This would put in its place an
administrative regime not unlike workers' compensation or
Social Security. Under this approach, experts would impose
their own assessment of risk, civil punishment, and the
value of intangible losses on the public,4 because the public
is supposed to be illogical in its evaluation of these things
and so should have its power curbed.5
The purpose of this article is to uncover the normative
assumptions and consequences of this movement by
investigating one of its main strategies: promoting
comparability review of damages for intangible losses. By
using the term "comparability review" here I refer to the
practice of an appellate court reviewing a damage award for
nonpecuniary harms to determine if it equates with
damages given in other cases. If the award does not, then
the damages are typically remitted to a figure that the
appellate court chooses. The United States Supreme
Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence is the most
visible example of a comparability requirement being
imposed on monetary awards;7 however, demanding that
4. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2002); REID HASTIE ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES
DECIDE (Cass Sunstein ed., 2002).
5. Consider this statement:
[A] degree of insulation from populist pressures, combined with a
knowledge of behavioral economics, might produce some improvement
[in regulation]. New institutions may play a role; consider Justice
Breyer's plea for an insulated body of specialized civil servants,
entrusted with the job of comparing risks and ensuring that resources
are devoted to the most serious problems .... We also emphasize that
government intervention need not come in highly coercive forms;
perhaps distortions in people's decision-making can be overcome by
information campaigns falling well short of coercion.
Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 49.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 79-131.
7. Along with the emphasis on damages for intangible losses, a major target
of this movement has been jury trial of punitive damages. In a trio of recent
cases, State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); and
BMW of America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Supreme Court has radically
transformed the pre-existing law of punitive damages. See infra text
accompanying notes 116-26. Behavioral law and economics arguments have
been influential in this development. For example, in Cooper Industries, Inc.,
the Court declared that jury determinations of punitive damages express moral
condemnation, not facts. Thus, the jury's assessment can be undone using a
non-deferential standard of review. In support of this conclusion the Court
specifically cited to Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2,
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damages for intangible losses in one case be related to those
in others is more insidious and significant.8 Under this form
of comparability review a tribunal reduces a plaintiffs
compensation for nonpecuniary harms on the sole ground
that it does not compare with compensation assessed in
other disputes. The justification is that damages for
intangibles are inconsistent and so violates norms of justice,
efficiency, and legitimacy.9 Yet losses like pain and
suffering and emotional distress affect the most unique
aspects of our being and cannot in principle be equated
from case to case. Comparability review ignores this
difficulty. It rests instead on a discredited form of
utilitarianism, one that treats the internal states of
different individuals as virtually the same. ° In this way, it
flies in the face of our intuitive sense of self and the law's
fundamental assumption that separate persons are
juridically basic entities."
at 2079. See Cooper Industries, Inc., 532 U.S. at 432 n.5. The Court stated:
"Because the jury's award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of
fact, appellate review of the district court's determination that an award is
consistent with due process does not implicate the Seventh Amendment
concerns raised by respondent and its amicus." Id. at 437. However, usurpation
of the trial process is not limited to punitive damages. The proponents of
bureaucratic rationality also allege that compensation for harms like libel,
sexual harassment, and intangible losses, such as pain and suffering, are
equally susceptible to populist irrationality at trial and so ought to be controlled
by those wiser and more experienced rather than by juries or trial judges. See
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2131-37.
8. The attack on damages for nonpecuniary harms has been obscured by the
campaign to reduce punitive damages. However, compensation for intangible
losses like pain and suffering make up the majority of the damages in personal
injury cases and often all the damages in intentional torts or actions for
constitutional violations. In personal injury actions, this is because
compensation for intangible losses is usually reflected by a multiplier of the
plaintiffs liquidated damages. See, e.g., Paul v. Aztec Indus. Inc., 2002 WL
54750, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2002) (unpublished opinion). Where an
intentional wrong or a constitutional violation does not cause pecuniary harm,
still mental distress is an actual damage that can be recovered. See, e.g., Carey
v. Phiphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
9. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS V 3-5 (1998).
10. Some may understand "the crisis of economics" to be caused by questions
concerning the comparability of states between persons. See Robert Cooter &
Peter Rappaport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 507 (1984); Harvey Lebenstein, Microeconomics and X-
Efficiency Theory, in THE CRISIS IN ECONOMIC THEORY (Daniel Bell & Irving
Kristol eds., 1981).
11. For instance, in GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
IDENTIFICATION, A SEPARATE BRANCH OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1892) the
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Despite these problems, proponents of comparability
review aggressively champion it. It is revealing to explore
why. First, comparability review masks the normative
choice to treat our internal states as if they are equivalent
to promote other, unexpressed, policy goals. Second, it
obscures a higher order decision about values, namely to
use maximization of expected utility as the model of
rationality for assessing law.12 Critics suggest that if legal
decision-making deviates from that standard, then its
processes, including trial, should be jettisoned. 3 This is an
exceptionally controversial assertion and one that, I argue,
ought to be subject to democratic deliberation before being
imposed on the public.
Currently, these changes are occurring outside the
democratic process, for in comparability review, the
proponents of behavioral law and economics can have it
both ways. The device of comparing damage awards focuses
on changing the standard of appellate review, not on
enacting legislation. In this way, the historic power over
damages previously given to juries and trial judges is
transferred to appellate tribunals. The judges of these
tribunals function as shadow bureaucrats by comparing
data culled from disparate cases and imposing a range of
acceptable compensation on litigants. This tactic achieves a
scheme of bureaucratic control without having to submit
the scheme to legislative debate, and it cloaks the
pragmatic effect of the movement, which is a reduction in
the total damages paid by repeat defendants. If the call for
comparability succeeds, it will be a stark example of
manipulating procedure for substantive ends, for it will
significantly reduce the compensation given in countless
cases.
My argument proceeds in three parts. Part I, the
Crudeness of Comparability Review, reveals that
attempting to equate intangible losses across cases is more
arbitrary than the concerns it seeks to remedy. It also
identifies the flaws in the empirical studies that try tojustify the practice. Part II, the Incoherence of
premise is that locating the correct person for ascribing legal responsibility or
allocating legal rights and liabilities is so important that it ought to be treated
as a special subject of the general law of evidence. Id.
12. See Jean Hampton, Failure of Expected Utility Theory as a Theory of
Reason, 10 ECON. & PHIL. 195 (1996).
13. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1917-22.
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Comparability Review, establishes that these are not just
problems of implementation. Given the nature of
nonpecuniary harms, it is not possible to compare them in
utilitarian terms. Thus, the arguments for comparability
review must have another goal. Part III, the Real Agenda:
Tort Reform by Sleight of Hand, shows that the choices to
treat intangible losses as the same and to use a narrow
conception of rationality for judging law differentially
advantage repeat defendants. This effects a major policy
change with no democratic input.
Before proceeding with the discussion, it is important to
note several things. First, this article focuses on
comparability review in the federal courts. This is because
certain federal tribunals, like the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, have been its most enthusiastic practitioners. 4
And, due to federalism, the most problematic forum for
engaging in comparability review is the federal system.
Second, this article is not about the role of juries.
Comparability review has been criticized primarily as a
violation of the right to jury trial, 5 but the implications go
much deeper. When a trial judge denies a motion for a new
trial due to the alleged excessive nature of the damage
award, the judge has implicitly decided that the jury's
verdict is not unreasonable.16 Moreover, even when a bench
trial is involved, the trial judge may still be required to
compare cases to justify the award given for intangible
losses. 7 Therefore, whenever a federal appellate court
14. In fact, the federal circuit courts are split over whether judges should
have the power to control a jury's damage award for intangible losses by
comparing the award rendered with damages given in other cases. See J.
Patrick Elsevier, Note, Out of Line Federal Courts Using Comparability to
Review Damage Awards, 33 GA. L. REV. 243, 251-52 (1998).
15. For instance, the comparability requirement in the context of punitive
damages is primarily seen as an attack on the jury system. See, e.g., Lisa
Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury Assessed
Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 36 U.S.F.
L. REV. 411 (2001); Colleen P. Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies,
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 192-93 (1999).
16. See 11 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§
2807, 2820 (Civil 2d. 1995).
17. See Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001). As
Judge Posner stated in his opinion:
And when the trier of fact is a judge, he should be required as part of
his Rule 52(a) obligation to set forth in his opinion the damages awards
that he considered comparable. We make such comparisons routinely
in reviewing pain and suffering awards. It would be a wise practice to
2003] 255
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vacates a damage award on the ground that it is too large,
the court has second-guessed not only the jury's judgment,
but the trial judge's as well.18 Finally, the terminology I use
in this discussion should be clarified. The expressions
referring to pain and suffering and mental distress are
contested. For some, these losses are "noneconomic." This is
misleading nomenclature, both in virtue of human
experience and in virtue of economics itself. What is really
meant by the moniker "noneconomic" damages is that these
items have no obvious market price and are "nonpecuniary"
or "intangible" in that sense. 9 To avoid the implication that
pain and suffering and mental distress do not reflect real
costs, I will use the terms "nonpecuniary" and "intangible"
to designate the losses/harms to the internal states of
plaintiffs that are the targets of comparability review.
I. THE CRUDENESS OF COMPARABILITY REVIEW
Proponents of comparability review argue that damages
for intangible losses should be consistent.2! They assert that
follow at the trial level as well.
Id. at 759 (citations omitted). See also Waering v. United States, 943 F. Supp.
1504, 1543 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (comparing awards despite noting that decisions
under the law of Guam were skeptical of the appropriateness of comparing
awards for intangible losses; however, the court upheld the $1.5 million based
on its comparison).
18. As Charles Alan Wright describes the deference given trial judges on
damages before the contemporary erosion of their power:
The Supreme Court said long ago that "motions for new trial based on
the ground that the damages allowed by the verdict are excessive"
present "purely a question of fact, not determinable by any fixed and
certain rule of law," and that such motions are submitted to the legal
discretion of the trial court, which cannot be reviewed. Thus, it was
once well settled that it was exclusively for the trial court to determine
whether a new trial should be granted because the verdict was
excessive or inadequate.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2820.
19. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 182 (3d ed. 1986). It is
ironic that in his decisions on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge
Posner has been one of the most aggressive proponents of comparability review,
despite his acknowledgment in academic works that nonpecuniary losses reflect
real costs.
20. As Blumstein discussed: "An unexplained outlier should constitute a
prima facie case for either remittitur or additur by the trial judge or an
appellate holding of inadequacy or excessiveness of the judgment." James F.
Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. REG. 171, 179 (1991).
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the norms of justice, efficiency, and legitimacy require the
practice. Considering political morality, adherents claim
that a just legal regime requires treating similarly situated
persons equally. If liability for damages is a function of a
particular trial rather than objective features of the
litigants, principles of formal justice have been violated.
Comparability review restores the principle of treating likes
alike. 21 Examining efficiency, behavioralists argue that
damage assessments are idiosyncratic; thus, some of them
must be inaccurate.22 The under- or over-compensation
these inaccurate results cause incorrectly reflect the costs
and benefits involved in social activity and under- or over-
deter behavior the law seeks to regulate. Comparability
review ameliorates this problem by forcing awards into line
with each other. Even if these damages were accurate,24
they make total expenditures for compensation harder to
predict by repeat defendants. Comparability review would
make compensatory damages more ascertainable in
advance, by reducing the range of their variability. 5
Finally, advocates of comparability review claim that
inconsistent damage awards cause the system of tort
compensation to appear volatile and arbitrary thereby,
undermining its legitimacy.6
21. See Sunstein et al, Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2077.
While the authors here are concerned with consistency in regard to punitive
damages, they argue that awards for intangible harms are susceptible to the
same problems. Id. at 2137-38.
22. One of the primary concerns of David Baldus and others is that damages
for children's injuries are often under-compensatory. See David Baldus et al.,
Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damage Assessments: A Proposal for the
Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms
and Punitive Damages, 80 IowA L. REV. 1109, 1121-22 (1995) [hereinafter
Baldus Study]. However, because additur is not available in the federal courts,
this problem cannot be solved in the federal system. See infra text
accompanying notes 83-86.
23. See Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2077,
2078 n.26.
24. Consider this statement from the Baldus Study:
How, it is asked, do we know whether these earlier decisions are
"correct"? We do not, of course. Indeed, there is no "correct" general
damages award for any nonpecuniary harm. Rather, the test is the
impact of the award under review on the general level of consistency
among similar cases.
Baldus Study, supra note 22, at 1182.
25. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2077.
26. According to critics, the worries over justice, efficiency, and legitimacy
are particularly great with jury assessments. These arguments show a subtext
2003] 257
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While increasing justice, efficiency, and legitimacy are
commendable goals, comparability review is ill-suited to
achieve them. This is because it erodes fundamental
principles central to the traditional system of tort
compensation. Moreover, the actual process of comparing
awards is so crude that it increases the arbitrariness of
damages. 7 To understand what is at stake and how far it
deviates from the norm, one must consider the pre-existing
legal treatment of compensation for nonpecuniary harms.
This is the default position that behavioralists must
overcome in order to justify the radical and undemocratic
changes they support.
A. The Default Position on Damages
Damage awards have been issues for the trier of fact,
usually a jury, to resolve.2" Historically, the power to impose
monetary liability could be a tool of oppression and the jury
acted as a bulwark against tyranny by its power to decide
whether to impose liability and how much to award.29 Until
the middle of the Twentieth Century, there was a clear
policy of allowing the jury to assess damages in the federal
system, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, where the very
right to jury trial has been in doubt, the Supreme Court has
looked to the question of whether the classic remedy at law,
compensatory damages, was available as the decisive factor
militating in favor of jury trial." In the contemporary era,
that nonpecuniary losses are more suspect than other sorts of harm and invite
juries to pursue illegitimate redistributive goals when assessing compensation.
Id. See also Blumstein et al., supra note 20, at 174-75; Oscar G. Chase, Helping
Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (1995)
(arguing for a pain and suffering schedule or grid).
27. See Elsevier, supra note 14, at 258-63. See also infra text accompanying
notes 79-151.
28. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 24
(1935) ("The amount of the damages.., from the beginning of trial by jury, was
a 'fact' to be found by jurors.").
29. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150-57 (1968) (cataloging
numerous authorities for the proposition that, since Magna Carta, the jury was
conceived as a major protection against governmental oppression). But see Lars
Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1606-07 (2001) (arguing
that in civil cases, juries do not have a legitimate role in protecting a litigant
from oppression).
30. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-6 (1974) (holding that a
jury trial must be granted in a case involving "rights and remedies of the sort
258 [Vol. 51
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the Court's commitment to jury trial is more doubtful, due
to its decisions in critical cases involving summary
judgment, judgments as a matter of law, and punitive
damages.1 Nonetheless, the Seventh Amendment shows the
importance of jury trial to the founders of the constitution
and acts as a barrier to removing damage determinations
from the trial process. 2
When a jury returns a verdict in the federal courts, its
decision is generally entitled to deference by the trial
judge.33 However, that deference is limited. A series of
motions and procedures cede power to the judge to prevent
an unreasonable jury verdict. Through motions for
summary judgment and judgments as a matter of law,
defendants frequently achieve victory without the case ever
being submitted to a jury." More significantly, through the
typically enforced in an action at law," such as a damages action). See also Ross
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (stating that the Seventh
Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on legal claims and that questions
about damages are legal questions). But see Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
427 (1987) (authorizing removal of the statutory penalty phase of an action
under the Clean Water Act from the jury on the ground that Congress intended
to grant the trial judge authority to set the penalty and that, "[s]ince Congress
itself may fix the civil penalties, it may delegate that determination to trial
judges").
31. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary
judgment); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (directed verdict);
Cooper v. Leatherman Indus., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) (punitive damages).
32. For instance, whether Congress has the power in the face of the Seventh
Amendment to legislatively limit the right to jury trial for historically common
law actions is an open question. The technique for doing so most likely would be
to replace common law claims with a statutory scheme, and then to assign
proceedings there to be an administrative tribunal. Regarding this technique,
the Supreme Court stated in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33
(1989):
Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public rights free
from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it assigns their
adjudication to tribunals without statutory authority to employ juries
factfinders. But it lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of
private right of the constitutional right to jury trial .... If a statutory
right is not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program
Congress has power to enact and if the right neither belongs to nor
exists against the Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated by
an Article III court. If the right is legal in nature, then it carries with it
the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial.
Id. at 51-2, 54-4.
33. See Candelaria v. Rodriguiz, 218 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84-85 (D. Puerto Rico
2002); Giles v. Rhodes, 171 F. Supp. 2d 220, 225-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a):
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motion for a new trial, the trial judge has the opportunity to
act almost as a thirteenth juror and to weigh the evidence
to determine the validity of the jury's judgment.35 However,
to preserve the delicate balance between judge and jury, a
trial judge may only vacate the jury's award if it is
"monstrously excessive," "shocks the conscience" of the
court, has "no rational connection" to the evidence, or
clearly "appears to be the result of passion and prejudice."36
When a defendant appeals the amount of damages given by
a jury and argues that the trial judge should have granted a
new trial, the standard of review applied to the trial court's
refusal to do so is abuse of discretion.37
As I have said, comparability review does not just erode
the power of juries; it also undermines trial judges. This is
especially true in the federal system, where there are many
tort-like causes of action that do not carry the right to jury
trial with them. For instance, a jury is not allowed under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 even though the act generally
borrows the state law of torts to establish liability and
[Ihf during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to
an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue,
the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (providing that a judge may enter judgment in
favor of a moving party where there is "no genuine issue as to any material
fact").
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a):
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues ... in an action in which there has been trial by jury,
for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been
granted in actions at law....
Id. How far a trial judge can go in assessing the evidence without actually
functioning as an additional juror is ambiguous. This issue arises most
intensely in the context of a verdict being set aside on the grounds that it is
against the weight of the evidence. See 11 WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 16, § 2806
("lOin a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, the judge is free to weigh the evidence for himself.").
36. See 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2807 (discussing the multitude of
phrases used to describe the level of unreasonableness or excessiveness a
damage award must reach to justify a judge's grant of new trial).
37. See, e.g., Green Admin. Of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 660 (5th
Cir. 2002) ("In reviewing a jury award, we are reviewing the district court's
denial of a motion for a new trial or remittitur. Because the district court has a
wide range of discretion in acting on such motions, the standard of review is
abuse of discretion."); Mathur v. Bd. of Trustees of Southern Illinois Univ., 207
F.3d 938, 944 (7th Cir. 2000).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (West 2003).
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damages.39 And, in many causes of action where the
problem of jury bias may be significant, e.g., in race
discrimination cases, the plaintiff may prefer a bench trial.
When a trial judge decides facts in a bench proceeding, the
judge must make findings to support her or his decision.4"
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly require that
the court's findings not to be set aside on appeal unless they
are "clearly erroneous,"41 especially due to the trial judge's
"opportunity... to judge of the credibility of witnesses. 42
All of these principles establish a default position on- the
procedure for appeals from damage awards: appellate
courts must give deference to the amount of damages fixed
at the ground level of trial-whether by a jury or a trial
judge; they may not use a de novo standard of review to
substitute their own view of what damages should be.43 If
this is the procedural norm that comparability review
challenges, what is the default position on entitlement to
and measurement of compensation for intangible losses?
Despite the increasingly "public" character of modern
litigation,44 the traditional system of tort compensation
39. See Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
41. Id.
42. Id. Also consider this statement from the Supreme Court:
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to
the superiority of the trial judge's position to make determinations of
credibility. The trial judge's major role [in a bench trial] is the
determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes
expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals
would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact
determination at a huge cost in diversion ofjudicial resources....
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
43. In fact, for many years, no appellate review of damages on the grounds
of excessiveness was permitted. See infra text accompanying notes 87-91.
44. Abram Chayes argued:
[Flederal courts are no longer called upon to resolve private disputes
between private individuals according to the principles of private law.
Instead, they are asked to deal with grievances over the administration
of some public or quasi-public program and to vindicate the public
policies embodied in the governing statutes or constitutional
provisions.
Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term: Forward: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982). Chayes explains that the
development of this "public law litigation" is due to the advent of new statutory
schema addressing broad social problems, particularly those dealing with
discrimination, and the procedural innovations of class actions and similar
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requires that damages reflect the plaintiffs particular
circumstances. This is consistent with the notion that the
common law vindicates individual rights, i.e., an
ascertainable person's rights to property, to freedom of
contract, or to bodily integrity.45 It is also consistent with
the Supreme Court's implicit stance that, in general, the
American system of justice does not recognize group harm.46
devices. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
45. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 110-23 (1977). Perhaps
the best expression of this notion in the legal context stems from Wesley
Hohfeld's well-known conception of a jural correlative. As Stanley Benn
describes one formulation of Hohfeld's rights theory:
He [Hohfeld] uses the word "right" specifically for the case in which one
says, 'X has a right (or claim or demand-as some writers put it) to $10
from Y;' this has as its correlative a duty (or one might say specifically,
an obligation of Y to X to do some particular act that X desires him to
do.)
See Stanley L. Benn, Rights, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 196 (1967). In a
different vein and more modernly, according to Ronald Dworkin's well-known
"right thesis," adjudication should resolve the competing and concrete rights
claim of actual litigants, and not nakedly promote collective policy goals more
properly allocated to legislative determination. As Dworkin puts it:
Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals
have rights, when, for some reason, a collective goal is not sufficient
justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have
or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury
upon them.
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Introduction xi (1977)
(paperback ed.). Roderick Hills characterizes Dworkin's theory this way:
Dworkin places "the individual at the center" of his theory of rights by
making rights "trumps" over collective interests that might otherwise
seem, in some sort of utilitarian calculus to outweigh the individual
interest protected by the right. The reason for giving extra weight to
the decisions protected by such trumps is that they are especially
important to the personal dignity of the individual's "equal concern and
respect."
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78
NYu. L. REV. 144, 157-58 (2003). Whether these individual rights are founded
on a natural law conception or a positivist one, in the context of the mainstream
account of the American legal system, individuals are the bearers of rights, not
groups.
46. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383, 395 (1992)
(refusing to extend the group defamation theory in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952). The concept that a group might have rights separate and apart
from the aggregate of the rights of its members is controversial in political and
legal philosophy. That is because, in mainstream theories, only persons possess
rights, not collectivities as things in themselves. See Ronald R. Garet,
Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S.C. L. REV. 1001, 1001
n.1 (1983). The closest the Supreme Court has ever come to embracing a theory
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Nonpecuniary losses usually include the pain and
suffering and/or mental distress that a victim experiences
as a result of physical injury or an intentional or dignitary
tort, including constitutional violations." The law of Anglo-
American remedies has struggled with the question of how
particularized to the claimant damages must be, and what
particularization means where intangible losses are
involved.48 On the one hand, compensation is given to
actual, concrete plaintiffs for their pain and suffering and
mental distress, On the other, plaintiffs must prove the fact
of their damages with appropriate certainty and the
amounts given should be objectively quantified to the
extent possible. In the case of contract and property
litigation, market-based measures provide certainty,
objectivity, and quantification,49 but there is no recognized
of groups rights (outside the context of religion) is found in its decision
validating a state law criminalizing group libel, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952). In that case, among other rationale for the result, Justice
Frankfurter explicitly relied on the notion of a group right. See Evan P. Schultz,
Group Rights, American Jews, and the Failure of Group Libel, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 71, 76 (2000). However, although Beauharnais has never been directly
overruled, its theoretical implications have not been developed and it is largely
viewed as an anomalous and discarded precedent. Thus, when the issue of
regulating hate speech reached the Court in the contemporary era, it did not
feel bound by Beauharnais and it has not embraced the notion of a group right
to justify such regulation. See Thomas Kleven, Free Speech and the Struggle for
Power, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 315, 348-49 (1992). Perhaps the Court's
recent decision in Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1536 (2003), which upheld
portions of a Virginia law criminalizing cross-burning with an intent to
intimidate, signals greater sensitivity to the problem of group harm.
47. In the latter case, the clearest example is the relatively modern tort
cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. See WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4"h ed. 1971). See, e.g., Kerr v.
Boyles, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993) (indicating that numerous jurisdictions
allow recovery for infliction of emotional distress-an intangible loss).
48. Much of this struggle is over whether the law of torts should promote
corrective justice, which focuses on the entitlement of particular victim to
compensation from the one who has harmed him or her, or utilitarian notions
which focus more on the overall utility to the social group of compensatory
schemes. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 562-68 (discussing the
tension between the individualist assumptions of classic tort law and the
modern procedure of class action litigation). Rosenberg associates the
"individualistic premise" of tort law with theories of corrective justice, not
utilitarian ones. Id. at 580.
49. For instance, if Doe breaches a contract to sell 100 widgets to Roe, Roe's
damages can be fixed by comparing the contract price to the fair market price
for widgets at the time of the breach. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-713 (2001). Similarly,
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market in human anguish to use for intangible losses.5"
United States v. Hatahley ("Hatahley IF),51 a 1950s decision
if Smith breaches a contract to purchase Greenacre from Jones, the law will
compensate Jones for any loss by calculating the difference between the
contract price and the fair market price of the realty. Where market-based
measures of recovery fail to adequately compensate, an equitable remedy like
specific performance may be given, obviating the need for exact quantification.
Under the classic market model, the plaintiffs damages are individualized (Roe
lost the widget sale and no one else, Jones owned Greenacre and no one else),
made certain, and liquidated, all by a means that describes the plaintiffs injury
in virtue of an external guide.
50. Some theorists argue that a market can be constructed from a model
based on what people pay to insure against risk. See POSNER, supra note 19, at
182-85. Intangible losses can be conceived as a standard component of
compensation on a straightforward model, i.e., real losses that should be
compensated in dollars for the full cost of the defendant's behavior. Id.
Alternatively, nonpecuniary awards have been treated as "non-compensatory"
simply because there is no market for them providing the basis for translating
them easily into dollars. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-
EQUITY-RESTITUTION 211 (2d ed. 1993). Those who adopt this view, but still hold
that compensation for intangibles is appropriate, usually give three reasons for
their position. First, such damages ameliorate the under-compensation present
in most tort litigation, because even winning plaintiffs must bear their own
attorney's fees. See Aleskya Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). Second, they "provide a sense of public sympathy and fellow-feeling for a
grievously injured person." See DOBBS, supra. Third, they increase the
effectiveness of deterrence. Id. at 212. Moreover, in terms of economics, the
mere difficulty of valuing an item in monetary terms does not render the item
"noneconomic." See Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior,
in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 6, 7 (Avery Weiner Katz
ed. 1998):
The economic approach is clearly not restricted to material goods and
wants, nor even the market sector. Prices, be they the money prices of
the market sector or the "shadow" imputed prices of the nonmarket
sector, measure the opportunity cost of using scarce resources and the
economic approach predicts the same kind of response to the shadow
prices as to market prices.
And:
Indeed, I have come to the position that the economic approach is a
comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior, be it
behavior involving money prices or shadow prices, repeated or
infrequent decisions, large or minor decisions, emotional or mechanical
ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, adults or children, brilliant
or stupid persons, patients or therapists, businessmen or politicians,
teachers or students.... It is an appropriate approach to go with such
a broad and unqualified definition and with the statement by [George
Bernard] Shaw that begins this essay ['Economy is the art of making
the most of life']. ..
Id. at8.
51. 257 F. 2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958) [hereinafter Hatahley II].
THE END OF TRIAL DAMAGES
involving a long-simmering dispute over Native Americans
and grazing rights, illustrates these tensions.
As a result of attempts by ranchers to remove Navajo
Indian families from their ancestral grazing areas located
on federal lands, the United States Bureau of Land
Management rounded up the families' horses and burros
without notice and destroyed them in violation of the
Federal Range Code (promulgated pursuant to the Taylor
Grazing Act) 52 On previous review in the same case,53 the
Supreme Court ruled this a trespass under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and indicated that compensatory damages,
consequential damages, and damages for emotional distress
all could be recovered. ' However, the Court remanded for
recalculation of damages, because the trial judge had given
the plaintiffs $100,000 as a group award for mental distress
and made inadequate findings.55 On remand, the trial judge
made more specific findings, but awarded each plaintiff the
sum of $3500 for emotional distress.56 The Tenth Circuit
reversed again with the following statement:
The District Court seemed to think that because the horses and
burros played such an important role in the Indians' lives, the
grief and hardships were the same to each. The equal award to
each plaintiff was based upon the grounds that it was not possible
to separately evaluate the mental pain and suffering as to each
individual, and that it was a community loss and a community
sorrow....
Pain and suffering is a personal and individual matter, not a
common injury, and must be so treated. 57
To treat pain and suffering as an "individual" matter,
strategies for concretizing damages for intangible losses
52. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 175-76 (1956).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 182.
55. Id.
56. See Hatahley 11, 257 F.2d at 924-25.
57. Id. at 924.
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have emerged, such as the "per diem" argument58 and the
practice of informing juries of the amount a plaintiff prays
for in the complaint, but neither is accepted in all
jurisdictions. 9 In most states the amount of damages for
intangible losses is left to the fact-finding function of the
jury. It is to render an amount that is reasonable based on
the plaintiffs testimony and any evidence supporting that
narrative.
One response to the nonmarket basis of these awards is
to argue that they are not compensatory at all-mental
distress and pain and suffering cannot be undone; the
feelings involved cannot be "unfelt.""°  But, this is
problematic for several reasons. Recovery for these harms
has a long history.6 Even in purely economic terms they
can be counted as real costs, so that freeing the defendant
from paying them externalizes the detriments of unwanted
behavior and skews the correct valuation of the defendant's
conduct for society overall. Consider Judge Posner's
characterization:
Damage awards for pain and suffering, even when apparently
generous, may well undercompensate victims seriously crippled by
accidents. Since the loss of vision or limbs reduces the amount of
pleasure that can be purchased with a dollar, a very large amount
58. The "per diem" argument is that intangible loss can be calculated by
translating it into units-of-time, usually of short duration, and then aggregating
those units to reach a total sum to represent the plaintiffs total loss over a
much longer period of time. For instance, a plaintiff badly burned in a car
accident might argue that $1.00 per hour is a reasonable amount to compensate
for the mental distress associated with disfigurement. When that small amount
is totaled for each day, week, month, and year of the plaintiffs reasonable
future life span, damage amounts quickly become large. See, e.g., Loth v. Truck-
A-Way Corp., 60 Cal. App. 4th 757, 765 n.8 (1998).
59. According to Douglas Laycock: "Roughly equal numbers of states permit
or forbid per diem arguments, and a third group permits them only with
cautionary instruction .... The federal circuits are also split; they treat the
issue as a procedural one and apply federal law in diversity cases." See
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 150 (3d
ed. 2002).
60. See, e.g., McDougal v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989) (ruling
that recovery for intangible losses "rests on the legal fiction that money
damages can compensate for a victim's injury") (cited in LAYCOCK, supra note
59, at 177).
61. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Theodore M. Bailey, The History of Payment for
Pain and Suffering, in JEFFREY O'CONNELL & RITA JAMES SIMON, PAYMENT FOR
PAIN AND SUFFERING: WHO WANTS WHAT, WHEN AND WHY? app. at 83-109 (1972)
(tracing some of the concepts of recovery to Roman law).
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of money will frequently be necessary to place the victim in the
same position of relative satisfaction that he occupied before the
accident. The problem is most acute in a death case. Most people
would not exchanie their lives for anything less than an infinite
sum of money ....
Furthermore, many other losses cannot literally be
undone, but are compensated by money. In fact, most
remedies in American law are substitutionary, not
specific,63 and American courts enter money judgments for
plaintiffs who would often prefer to obtain an in-kind
remedy, such as the specific performance of the defendant's
contract promise.64 Relativizing damage awards to a
particular plaintiff not only reflects the common law
tradition of vindicating individual rights, but it
acknowledges that each litigant is entitled to due process.
Generally, unless a plaintiff has had her own day in court
she is not bound by determinations in other proceedings.69
This should be especially true for intangible losses, because
one human being's pain and suffering or mental injuries
cannot literally be another's.
In a democracy, the method for deviating from default
rules like these should be to enact legislation. For example,
some states have promulgated statutory caps on the
amount that can be awarded for intangible losses." Both
the workers' compensation and Social Security systems,
which prohibit recovery for pain and suffering, 7 manifest
62. POSNER, supra note 19, at 182. Judge Posner goes on to note, however,
that as we tolerate risky behavior, it cannot be the case that the loss of a life
must be compensated by an infinite amount of money. Id. However, disallowing
any recovering for pain and suffering or death rests on "[tihe implicit
assumption that the person who has been killed obtained no utility from living!"
Id.
63. See LAYCOCK, supra note 59, at 16.
64. For instance, it is particularly difficult to achieve anything like the
specific performance of an employee's contract to work for an employer. See
DOBBS, supra note 50, § 12.22(2).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27 cmt. a., 29 (1982).
66. See Matthew W. Light, Note, Who's the Boss? Statutory Damage Caps,
Courts, and State Constitutional Law, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 315, 318 n.17, 18
(2001). According to Victor E. Schwartz and Leah Lorber, as of 2002, eighteen
states had passed some form of statutory cap on damages for nonpecuniary
harm. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and
Suffering Awards: Turning Compensation into "Punishment," 54 S.C.L. REV. 47,
60 n. 78 (2002).
67. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 860 (7th ed.
2000):
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legislative action. These measures have been controversial,
but they have been undertaken in public view and reflect
direct and unabashed policy choices about how to mediate
between the norms of full compensation and other values.
The relative transparency of the legislative process
compared to judicial proceedings is important. If the public
can muster adequate legislative majorities opposed to
damage caps, they will not be enacted or they can be
undone by subsequent legislation. Even if they are passed,
statutes that limit remedies for intangible losses can be
legally challenged directly, whereas procedural techniques
for bringing about substantive change cannot be so easily
targeted. In fact laws capping nonpecuniary damages have
been attacked by plaintiffs for violating federal and state
constitutional principles68 and some of these attacks have
been successful, usually under state constitutional
doctrines."
The relevance of state legislation to intangible losses
points out another problem with comparability review, i.e.,
it creates complex questions about the intersection of state
and federal law. In general, the substantive right to recover
damages nonpecuniary harms traces to the common law of
torts, which is typically a creature of state law.7 ° Thus,
following Erie Railroad v. Thompkins,71 there should be no
general federal common law of tort damages. 2 Nonetheless,
the federal courts may impose federal procedure in diversity
actions, particularly where it emanates from one of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a federal procedural
Scheduled damages in workers' compensations systems typically make
no independent allowance for pain and suffering damages. The same
result generally holds for no-fault automobile insurance plans used in
many states to supplement the tort system. Elimination of damages for
pain and suffering is often found in various first party insurance
schemes, including Social Security as well as Medicare and Medicaid.
Id.
68. See Light, supra note 66, at 338. According to Schwartz and Lorber,
"[c]ourts have struck down statutes limiting noneconomic damages as
unconstitutional on state law grounds in Alabama, Florida, Illinois, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Washington state."
Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 66, at 61 n. 80.
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Dep't. of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987)
(holding legislative cap on nonpecuniary damages as unconstitutional under the
open courts provision of the state constitution).
70. See PROSSER, supra note 47, at 327-35.
71 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72 Id. at 78.
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statute.73 But, where the procedural principle is judge-made
the analysis becomes murkier, especially when the effect of
the federal approach is to displace state substantive law.
These issues have cropped up repeatedly in the context of
differences over the allocation of power between judge and
jury,74 and trial judges and appellate courts.75
The justification for allowing procedural principles to
negate state law is that procedural uniformity is a matter of
"uniquely federal interest."76 This view affects the remission
of damages in the federal system as numerous opinions
have held that federal law governs the decision whether to
remit damages, even in a diversity action. 7 Although the
Supreme Court's decision in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc. suggests that state law should control
questions of whether damages are excessive, the federal
courts often elude its meaning. 9 It is troubling to note that
scholars have advocated comparability review as a way to
create a "common law" of damages; if this common law is
73. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965).
74. See, e.g,, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38
(1958); Mile High Indus. v. Cohen, 222 F.3d 845, 856 (10th Cir. 2000).
75. See Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 822 (6th
Cir. 2000) (ruling that federal law determines the appropriate standard of
review regarding the prejudicial nature of improper jury instructions); Jocks v.
Tavernier, 97 F. Supp. 2d 303, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that federal law
dictates the appropriate standards of review of jury verdicts for claims arising
under a federal statute).
76. See 11 WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 16, § 4514.
77. For instance, in Douglas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 897 F.3d 1336 (1990), a
wrongful death action brought by the wife and children of a decedent against
Delta Airlines, the Fifth Circuit ordered a remittitur of the children's verdicts
for lost society that had ranged from $270,000 for the son and $470,000 for the
daughter. The court purported to be following Texas damage principles,
including the rule that as long as an award does not exceed the largest award
previously given for a similar injury, it is not excessive. Even though the
plaintiffs cited a case in which a child was given an aggregate recovery of $1
million, the court still capped the Douglas children's loss of society verdicts at
$300,000 each. In doing so the court acknowledged that none of the cases cited
by the parties were analogous to the factual situation before it. See also Blanke
v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998); Reyes-Garcia v. Rodriguez
& Del Valle, Inc., 82 F.3d 11, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1996). But see Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 89 F.3d 1339, 1349-1350 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying
state law to determine whether a punitive damage award was too large).
78. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 136-45.
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applied to state-based claims in federal court, it is clearly in
tension with Erie.80
As the forgoing illustrates, comparability review
threatens the traditional system of tort compensation for
intangible losses. It drastically reduces the power of juries.
It significantly usurps the function of the trial judge both as
overseer of the jury and as trier of fact in a bench
proceeding. It undercuts the remedial principle that
damages must be particularized to the individual plaintiff.
It threatens the due process rights of litigants not to be
bound by proceedings in which they did not participate. It
evades democratic deliberation over contested values, while
at the same time it may undermine the substantive tort
policies of the states. Does comparability review as it is
actually practiced justify these consequences?
B. Comparability Review in Practice
In the federal system, comparability review is
intimately tied to the procedure of remittitur. Where the
grant of a new trial on the ground of an excessive verdict is
contemplated, a judge may remit the excessive amount, if
the plaintiff agrees, in lieu of ordering a new trial. The
practical effect of remittitur is to reduce the plaintiffs
damage award to a figure that the judge deems
appropriate."' Remittitur may occur at both the trial and
appellate levels, but it is more troublesome on appeal
because the reviewing court is not only displacing the jury's
80. See Blumstein et al., supra note 20, at 172-85 (arguing that there should
be a reporting system to record damage awards that would have precedential
value for determining future awards). Under the proposed system of "common
law" damages, any damage award that differs significantly from prior awards
would be subject to the burden of explanation by the jury and heightened
judicial review, while awards that fall within the middle range of prior amounts
would be presumptively valid. Id. at 178-79. Should the jury fail to identify
specific factors justifying an amount outside of the middle range (either at the
top or the bottom quartile of the distribution) that failure would constitute a
prima facie case for remittitur or additur. Id. at 179.
81. See 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2815:
[T]he court may condition a denial of the motion for new trial upon the
filing by the plaintiff of a remittitur in a stated amount. In this way the
plaintiff is given the option of either submitting to a new trial or of
accepting the amount of damages that the court considers justified.
270 [Vol. 5 1
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verdict, but also the trial judge's opinion that remittitur is
not warranted.82
As with other post-trial processes designed to control
jury discretion, remittitur implicates the Seventh
Amendment. In the 1935 decision, Dimick v. Schiedt," the
Supreme Court reiterated that remittitur was not an
unconstitutional violation of the Seventh Amendment's re-
examination clause but held that additur was.84 Its
reasoning was based on the relationship between remittitur
and the motion for a new trial. Because judges had long
granted new trials on the grounds of excessive verdicts, so
that the practice was enshrined in the jury trial right,
conditioning the denial of the motion for a new trial on a
plaintiffs agreement to remit damages was constitutional.
However, the court rejected similar reasoning for additur. It
argued that when a defendant is faced with agreeing to an
increase of damages on pain of a new trial, no jury has
considered the defendant's enlarged liability:
Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a
remission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible
support in the view that what remains is included in the verdict
along with the unlawful excess-in [the] sense that it has been
found by the jury-and that the remittitur has the effect of merely
lopping off an excrescence. But, where the verdict is too small, an
increase by the court is a bald addition of something, which in no
sense can be said to be included in the verdict.85
Consistent with Dimick, the standard for remitting a jury's
damage award is the standard that applies to the motion
for a new trial, i.e., abuse of discretion.
82. In the case of a bench trial, litigants may challenge findings by making a
motion to amend the findings and judgment, which may be combined with a
motion for a new trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b). Where a new trial is requested
after a bench trial, the grounds are those that support rehearings. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 59(a).
83. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
84. This clause expressly prohibits a court from independently re-examining
a jury's determination of facts:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
85 Id. at 486.
86. See Frazier v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 996 F.2d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 1993).
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The practice of remittitur is more complex and
troublesome at the appellate level. Whether federal appeals
courts had the constitutional power to review damages if
the trial judge did not disturb them was an open question
for many~years. In the 1887 case, Metropolitan Railroad Co.
v. Moore, the Supreme Court held that motions for a new
trial on the ground that a verdict is too large raise purely
factual questions.88 By so holding, the Court was effectively
stating that motions for a new trial are within the
discretion of the trial judge and cannot be reviewed. This
approach was repeatedly confirmed until the contemporary
era.89 In recent decades, all federal circuits have permitted
appellate review of verdicts for excessiveness following
denial of a motion for a new trial.9" In 1996, with the
decision of Gasperini, the Supreme Court explicitly
validated appellate review of damage awards for the firsttime.91
Comparability review factors into remittitur when, in
analyzing whether a new trial should have been ordered
unless damages were remitted, the court reviews damages
amounts from other cases. One of the problems with this
practice is that the information used is skeletal as it is most
often gathered from the official reports of cases appearing
in sources such as the West Reporter System.92 General
87. 121 U.S. 558 (1887). See also Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-54
(1946).
88 Id. at 574.
89. See 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2820.
90. Id.
91. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 434-36 (1996).
For a more thorough discussion of Gasperini see infra text accompanying notes
127-36.
92. See Zurba v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D.Ill. 2002). In
questioning the practicality of comparing awards, the trial judge stated:
The only materials reasonably available to litigants are reported
decisions from other cases or reports from publications such as the
Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter. Reliance on such evidence carries
with it inherent limitations. A reported decision concerning a trial
cannot possibly relate the course of a trial with the same detail and
flavor in which it was presented to the fact finder. The Jury Verdict
Reporter and similar publications tend to operate by asking lawyers to
respond to a series of pre-formatted questions about various
particulars of the case. This fill-in-the-blanks approach, though
certainly useful in helping lawyers evaluate cases, it at best a blunt
instrument in helping a fact finder determine what damage award is
appropriate. The problems are compounded when the information that
one is seeking concerns awards for pain and suffering, whether
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verdicts increase the unreliability of the sample, for they do
not disaggregate money to compensate physical injuries
from money to recompense intangible losses. When
comparability review becomes the basis for reversing an
otherwise reasonable damage award, even more indetermi-
nacy arises because the appellate court is making
judgments on a cold record that it compares to even more
limited and attenuated information derived from other
proceedings. While in the federal system, comparability
review was initiated in federal question cases, its principles
apply to most forms of intangible loss. This is because the
causes of action presented, whether based on federal law or
not, are typically parasitic off the common law of torts.93
The decision that began comparability review in
earnest is the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Levka v. City of
Chicago.94 The Levka case involved a challenge to Chicago's
policy of strip-searching every woman arrested and
detained in the county jail. In companion litigation, this
was ruled unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 95
Levka, a 53-year-old woman, was arrested on a
misdemeanor charge. After being transported to the jail,
she was strip-searched, required to remove her underwear,
and to bend over and spread her buttocks. Levka sued for a
physical or emotional or both. There is no exact standard for fixing
damages for pain and. suffering; courts routinely tell juries exactly this
when instructing them. It is impossible to know all of the factors that
led a jury or judge to make a particular award for pain and suffering in
a particular case. The fact finder's observation and assessment of the
plaintiff at trial, for example, may be a significant factor affecting the
award upward or downward, but this factor is unlikely to be assessed
in any source to which a court would look in attempting to determine
comparability. Just as importantly, different plaintiffs can experience
different levels of pain and suffering from similar incidents. A
defendant in a tort case "must take his plaintiff as he finds [her]," even
if she is more susceptible to injury than the average person. Thus two
cases arising from similar incidents may not be all that similar at all.
Id. at 961 (citations omitted). See also Baldus Study, supra note 22, at 1141-42.
As the Baldus Study reveals, review of this information is fairly limited. "[I]t is
not uncommon for a court to give scant attention to many vital details that bear
on the level of nonpecuniary harm in the review case." Id. at 1143.
93. For instance, in Carey v. Phiphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978), the
Supreme Court stated that § 1983 actions create a form of tort liability for the
violation of constitutional rights.
94. 748 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1984). Levka is the case credited with initiating
the trend toward comparability review in the federal system. See Elsevier,
supra note 14, at 243-44.
95. See Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
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violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thejury returned a verdict in her favor of $50,000 for emotional
distress. The trial judge did not disturb the award.
On review, the Seventh Circuit objected to the damages
as excessive. It did so on the sole ground that the award
was outside the range of damages given to others who had
been illegally searched by the Chicago police. The jury
verdicts in the cases stemming from the Chicago strip-
search policy ranged from $3000 to $112,000, with $112,000
being awarded to plaintiff Joan W.96 The court concluded
that Levka's damages were inconsistent when compared to
the cases in which juries had returned verdicts over $30,000
because they involved "aggravating" circumstances. In
remarking on the award in Joan W. v. City of Chicago, the
Seventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff there had been
ridiculed, humiliated, and taunted by the police matrons,
and repeatedly forced to bend and squat and push her
fingers into her vagina and rectum while they yelled at her
until she wept. Because it found no similar factors in
Levka's strip-search, the court cut Levka's damages in half.
In doing so it gave no reasons for the specific figure that it
chose. By this approach, the Seventh Circuit identified
"comparability" of an award for emotional distress to other
awards as a basis for remittitur or a new trial.
Ironically, the damages in the case of Joan W., the
award to which Levka's damages had been negatively
compared, itself came up for review one year after the
decision in Levka.97 According to the description of the facts,
Joan W. was a physician who had been stopped and
arrested for a misdemeanor traffic violation. She also
suffered from chronic arthritis, which made her sensitive
about her physical appearance. Five female matrons
searched her and forced her to remove all her clothes. She
was directed to expose her vaginal and anal areas to them,
and when she refused, the matrons swore and laughed at
her. The jury awarded her damages of $112,000, which
again were not disturbed by the trial judge. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit vacated the verdict and remitted her
damages to $75,000. Unbelievably, it referred to the
remitted amount of damages in Levka to support the
lowering of the award to Joan W. Thus, both cases were
96. See Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1985).
97. Id.
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placed in a negatively reinforcing relationship that
depressed the damages available in each. More important
was the court's failure to consider that different women
searched by a similar procedure might suffer different
mental distress:
Although the circumstances surrounding the arrests and
detentions of each of the plaintiffs-appellees ... are not identical,
the situations involve ... common elements ....
Joan's search was not different in kind from [the] aggravated
searches which had resulted in damage awards from $15,000 to
$60,000.
The emotional distress and trauma claimed by Joan W. was not
qualitatively more severe than that claimed by the four plaintiffs
in Mary G. or by Maria Levka.
98
While it conceded that the jury could rationally find
differences in the degree of harm due to the manner in
which Joan W. responded to the taunting, the court
remitted her damages to $75,000 and again gave no reasons
for how it arrived at that figure or why $75,000 was
permissible, but $112,000 was not.
Although the phenomenon of comparing damages for
intangible losses in one case with those given in another
became overt in the unique context of Chicago's strip-search
policies, the Seventh Circuit has applied it to a variety of
claims, including causes of action for racial discrimination
and sexual harassment.99 For instance, in Phillips v. Hunter
98. See id. at 1025-26 n.10 (quoting Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267).
However, the court later conceded that a jury could rationally find "some
difference" between Joan W.'s situation and Maria Levka's. Id. at 1025.
99. For instance, in Webb v. City of Chester, 813 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1987),
the court acknowledged that in gender discrimination cases, damage awards
are subject to comparability review, although there it found the award given
was within the range of the cases used for comparison.
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Trails Community Association,00 a case involving a claim of
housing discrimination brought under the Civil Rights and
the Fair Housing Acts, the Seventh Circuit remitted the
plaintiffs damages for humiliation and embarrassment
from $25,000 to $10,000, although a judge in a bench trial
made the original award. Because the damages were "more
than twice" the amount of damages previously given in the
Circuit for housing discrimination based on race, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the trial judge's assessment
was clearly erroneous."'
Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc."2 is a
particularly troubling opinion, for it shows how much the
Seventh Circuit discounts trial evidence on damages and,
more important, that it is motivated to remit awards in
present cases in order to keep the range of acceptable
damages low for future ones. In Avitia, the plaintiff sued
after being fired for challenging his employer's failure to
pay him overtime in violation of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act. The court arbitrarily cut the $21,000
damage award in half based on its concerns about how it
would affect the comparative sample of cases in the future:
An award of $21,000 is too much for a moment's pang of distress at
being fired, even distress enough to make a grown man cry who
believes-and we do not mean to criticize such a belief-that crying
is shameful in a man. There is more here but our only point is that
damages must be proportioned to injury, so that the slighter the
injury the smaller must be the award of damages if the plaintiff is
to oppose successfully a motion for a new trial or for a remission of
damages (remittitur). We have no reason to question Avitia's
sincerity but we would be naive to doubt that if the award of
$21,000 for the emotional distress caused him by being fired is
sustained, plaintiffs in subsequent cases of retaliatory discharge
will be sure to include a passage of testimony-always moving and
often as a practical matter irrefutable-modeled on Avitia's. He will
have furnished the script for countless plaintiffs in suits for
wrongful discharge. Twenty-one thousand dollars will tend to
become the floor for the award of nonpecuniary damages in such
103
cases.
100. 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982).
101. Id. at 190.
102. 49 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1995).
103. See id. at 1229.
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Other circuits impose comparability review in similar
ways. For instance, the Ninth Circuit, in McCarthy v.
United States,' involved a medical malpractice action
brought against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for severe injuries suffered by a child during a
botched delivery at an army hospital. Pursuant to the Act,
Washington state law determined the elements of liability
and recovery. The hospital conceded negligence, but the
court ordered a reduction in damages awarded in a bench"
trial for past and future pain and suffering, from $2.2
million to $1.1 million. The court argued that the award
was out of line in comparison to two other awards for birth
injuries, awards it had also remitted due to their alleged
incongruity with Washington cases. In Shaw v. United
States,' the court had found a verdict of $5 million for pain
and suffering comparatively excessive and remitted it to $1
million; similarly in Trevino v. United States, °6 it ordered
an award of $2 million to be reduced to $1 million "to
maintain some degree of uniformity" with Washington
cases."°7 Just as the Seventh Circuit put Levka and Joan W.
in a downward spiraling relationship using first one and
then the other to justify reducing both, so the court in
McCarthy used the already remitted awards in Trevino and
Shaw to justify a further reduction in the case before it. It
excoriated the trial judge for not getting the message that
intangible loss damages in excess of $1 million for birth
injuries would not be tolerated."8
Currently, comparability review is routine in the
Seventh Circuit as well as other circuits, and lower courts
bound by it have described the requirement in the context
of jury trial this way:
[TIhere are three criteria to evaluate whether a compensatory
damage award warrants a new trial or remittitur: (i) whether the
award is monstrously excessive; (ii) whether there is no rational
connection between the award and the evidence; and (iii) whether
104. 870 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1989).
105. 741 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984).
106. 804 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 1515.
108. McCarthy, 870 F.2d at 1501.
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the award is roughly comparable to awards made in similar
109
cases.
These factors do not function in the conjunctive. A jury
award that is not "monstrously" excessive and that does
show a rational connection between the amount given and
the evidence can still be reversed on the ground that it is
not "roughly comparable" to damage awards made in other
proceedings. In the case of bench trials, federal appellate
courts seem to assume that if a trial judge's assessment of
damages does not fall within a range of comparable cases it
is "clearly erroneous" for that reason alone.
More problematically, the Seventh Circuit has never
established the criteria for selecting the cases for
comparison, nor has the court set forth the form in which
they should be considered. It has not explained how the
salient features of different disputes are to be extracted
from decisions, and it has not even limited the cases to be
compared to the same geographic region.11 ° As the court
stated in Frazier v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.,"' "we
have never held that geographic similarity of cases is
required when comparing jury awards. In fact, we have
examined awards from other jurisdictions in considering
motions for a remittitur."'' Clearly this and other aspects of
comparability review are arbitrary."3 Nonetheless, the
practice has emerged in a variety of circuits covering
disparate causes of action-some involving jury trial and
109. See Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind., 103 F.3d 576, 580
(7th Cir. 1996).
110. See, e.g., Levka v. City of Chicago, 748 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1984). This is
particularly troublesome where a jury verdict is involved as the jury is supposed
to express the local community's will. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (requiring that the
jury represent a fair cross section of the community comprising the district or
division of the relevant federal trial court).
111 996 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 926.
113. The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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others using bench proceedings."' Where state law is
involved, it creates a complex and uneasy tension."'
The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on
remitting compensatory damage awards solely for their
dissimilarity to awards in other cases, but several recent
decisions indicate it might approve such a practice,
especially when undertaken by district court judges. In
BMW of America v. Gore1 6 the Court for the first time
invalidated a state punitive damage award on due process
grounds, primarily for its sheer size. Justice Scalia labeled
this approach in his dissent as a form of substantive due
process." 7 To avoid this charge, the majority attempted to
couch its opinion in the language of procedural due process.
Several features of the decision show a tendency to approve
of comparability standards generally.
An important factor in the Court's holding was the
connection it saw between the predictability of punitive
damages and principles of notice: "[ellementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence
dictate that a person receives fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the
114. See, e.g., Ascherman v. Catt, 2003 WL 1562213, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Feb.
26, 2003).
115. As of 1998, comparability review had been adopted in the Seventh,
Second and Fourth Circuits and used in specialized circumstances in the Third,
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. See Elsevier, supra note 14, at 251-52. It has
also been used in the Ninth Circuit.
116. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). There, BMW (both the manufacturer and
distributor) had followed a policy of selling damaged vehicles as new, where the
cost of repairing them did not exceed 3% of their value. Dr. Gore purchased a
car that had been repainted to fix acid rain damage incurred in transit. Upon
discovery of the vehicle's condition, he sued BMW on a variety of theories under
Alabama state law, including violation of consumer protection statutes and
fraud. His compensatory damages proven at trial were $4000, which
represented to the diminution in the fair market value of the car. The jury
assessed punitive damages against BMW of $4 million, which the Alabama
Supreme Court remitted to $2 million. The punitive damage amount was based
on sales made not only in Alabama, but across the country. This was
particularly problematic, because BMW's conduct was lawful in numerous
states. On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed on constitutional
grounds, finding that the award violated principles of due process.
117. Id. at 599-600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court's punitive damage
jurisprudence had in the past deferred to state court judgments regarding the
propriety of awards produced by fair procedures: "[Ihf 'fair procedures were
followed, a judgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a strong
presumption of validity."' Id. at 586-87 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
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severity of the penalty that a State may impose.""' To
provide adequate notice in the context of civil punitive
damages, the Court imposed three requirements: that any
award be proportional to the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, that there be a reasonable ratio
between the amount of compensatory damages suffered by
a plaintiff and a punitive award,11 s and that there not be too
great a disparity between the amount of punitive damages
and any civil or criminal penalties authorized for the same
or similar conduct (i.e., that they be roughly comparable). 12
The concurrences of Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Souter
especially stressed their concern with arbitrariness in the
context of open-textured standards: "Legal standards need
not be precise .... [b]ut they must offer some kind of
constraint upon a jury or a court's discretion... The
standards the Alabama courts have applied here are vague
and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary
results. ,,21
If anyone doubted the change in punitive damages that
Gore wrought, that doubt should be decisively dispelled by
the Supreme Court's recent opinion in State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Campbell.22 There it overturned a punitive
damage award of $145 million dollars that had been upheld
by the Utah State Supreme Court in a bad-faith-failure-to-
settle case.' 2' The Utah Supreme Court had affirmed the
award largely due to its concern over the amount of money
necessary to effectively deter defendant State Farm in light
of the reprehensibility of its conduct and its wealth.24 In
reversing, the Supreme Court referenced the Gore factors,
but went far beyond them 25 by designating in mathematical
terms what the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages
should be in most cases:
While these ratios [in previously decided cases] are not binding,
they are instructive. They demonstrate what should be obvious:
single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due
118. Id. at 574.
119. Id. at 580-81.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 588.
122. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
123. Id. at 1519.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1520-26.
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process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and
retribution .... 126
Read holistically, Gore and Campbell signal the Court's
openness to comparative standards as a means to concretize
damages for intangibles.
In Gasperini, the Court analyzed the significance of a
New York statute investing state appellate courts with the
power to reverse a damage award and order a new trial
solely on the ground that the amount "deviates materially"
from verdicts in other cases. 127 As a result of the statutory
change, New York's appellate courts no longer were
required to use deference when reviewing a trial court's
denial of a motion for a new trial on damages. Gasperini
was a photo-journalist who lent photographic transparen-
cies to the defendant, which the defendant lost. In a
diversity action the jury awarded him $450,000 in
compensatory damages, although there was no ready
market to value the lost transparencies.128 The defendant
moved for a new trial, which was denied. On appeal, the
Second Circuit felt constrained by the Erie doctrine 129 to
apply the New York statute after comparing Gasperini's
award to damages given for lost transparencies in other
cases. It vacated the verdict. 3 ' On review, the Supreme
Court had to analyze the intricate intersection of
federalism, standards of appellate review, and the Seventh
Amendment. It is a staple of Erie analysis that in a
diversity action, federal principles trump contrary state law
on purely procedural matters, while state substantive law
governs the rights and liabilities of the parties. However,
quickly after Erie it became clear that the substance-
procedure dichotomy could not be the sole determinant of
the bounds of federalism.' Later cases established that in
the absence of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or
126. Id. at 1524.
127. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 2001).
128. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 420. Gasperini's expert witness testified that
each transparency was worth $1500 according to the industry standard, based
on the potential royalties a photographer could earn over the life of the
copyright. Id.
129. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
130. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 420.
131. This was the key insight of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), which held that a statute of limitations is not clearly either substantive
or procedural, but because it is outcome determinative, state law must apply.
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procedural statute, where an issue determines the outcome
in a way that promotes forum shopping and the inequitable
administration of the laws, state law might still govern."'
Against this backdrop, the Second Circuit's reason for
applying the New York statute is instructive, particularly
for the policy implications of comparability review. In its
view, the legislative requirement of comparing damages
across cases was substantive because it was equivalent to a
cap on damages. The Supreme Court agreed with this
characterization: "We think it a fair conclusion that CPLR §
5501(c) differs from a statutory cap principally 'in that the
maximum amount recoverable is not set forth by statute,
but rather is determined by case.' ""', However, simply
importing the New York practice wholesale into the
activities of federal appellate courts would undermine
federal appellate practice by imposing a less deferential
standard of review.
34
As previously asserted, Levka-style comparability
review is as much about appellate court usurpation of trial
court prerogatives as it is about the abrogation of the jury's
functions. To mediate between the demands of federalism,
juries, and trial judges, the Supreme Court approved of the
New York practice, but only under two conditions: that the
inquiry into material deviation be undertaken by the trial
judge on post-trial motion, and that federal appellate courts
retain the abuse of discretion standard of review on appeals
from the verdict.35
The Court's resolution of these issues accomplished
several important things. First, it validated under the
Seventh Amendment appellate review of damage awards
generally. Second, it approved comparability review of
compensatory damages where state law requires it. In this
light, it is significant that the Court adopted the Second
Circuit's view that "whether an award of compensatory
damages exceeds what is permitted by law is not materially
different from the question whether an award of punitive
damages exceeds what is permitted by law.""13 Finally, the
Court's analysis revealed that comparability review is just
132. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
133. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429.
134. See 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2820 (2002 Pocket Part).
135. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438.
136. Id. at 435-36 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72
F.3d 1003, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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another form of capping damages. In this sense, it is a
procedural technique with a substantive goal.
But Gasperini is less than clear on some important
questions. For instance, what if a state's law actually
prohibits comparing awards? Or, what if a state allows
comparability, but does not treat it as an independent and
decisive factor for concluding an award is excessive? How
should the Erie doctrine be applied in such situations? In
those circumstances Gasperini should stand for the
principle that state law must govern whether and how
comparability review is used; however, later decisions show
that federal courts find ways to retain their methods of
comparability review, even when state law might be
different. Several recent cases provide interesting examples
of this phenomenon.
In Rusthaven v. American Airlines, Inc.,"' a diversity
action for personal injuries and loss of consortium brought
by a husband and wife, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged
that Gasperini bound it to follow state substantive law on
excessive verdicts, but in the same paragraph opined that,
"[tlhe manner in which we review the evidence is a
procedural matter governed by federal law."'38 The trial
court had denied the defendant's motion for a new trial or
remittitur, but the court of appeals insisted that the
plaintiffs agree to remit their damages to the amounts it
specified to avoid reversal.139 The reason given was that the
damages assessed for intangibles did not fall within the
range of damages given in other Arkansas cases. Thus, they
violated the Arkansas state standard that damages must
not "shock the conscience" of the court.4° Perhaps the
Eighth Circuit's assertion that, "[p] ast awards can be useful
in determining what is fair and reasonable and Arkansas
courts look to previous cases for guidance," mutes the
problem its analysis presents for Erie.' More troubling is
the possibility that the Eighth Circuit was simply importing
a comparability requirement into a diversity case under the
guise of following state law.
The infiltration of comparability review into diversity
actions is also evident in an opinion from the Fourth Circuit
137. 320 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2003).
138. Id. at 805-06.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 807.
141. Id.
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Court of Appeals. Steinke v. Beach Bungee, Inc.,42 involved
a tragic accident in which a seventeen-year-old boy was
killed in front of his parents. They were awarded $12
million in damages for mental distress. The trial court
refused to remit the plaintiffs damages but the court of
appeals remanded to require the trial court to give reasons
for denying remittitur. The court of appeals was bothered
by the fact that such a large verdict was returned "where no
pecuniary loss was involved." ' In commenting on the
standard on remand, the court imposed a comparability
requirement:
In determining on remand whether the jury's verdict was rendered
in accordance with South Carolina law, the district court should
look to South Carolina cases to determine the range of damages in
cases analogous to the one at hand .... If the court believes a
departure from the range is justified, it should provide the
reasoning behind its view. If the court determines that there are
no other comparable cases under South Carolina law, it should
explain this determination as well. Such a decision in the district
court will reduce the risk of caprice in large jury awards and will
assure a reviewing court that the trial court exercised its
considered discretion under the applicable state law.
44
By this twist of logic, following state substantive standards
under Erie!Gasperini actually requires comparability
review. To the Steinke Court, state law is honored in a
diversity case when the award reviewed is compared to
awards given in other cases from the state whose law must
be followed. No matter if South Carolina's courts do not
treat comparability as the sole ground for undoing an
otherwise proper damage award.
145
142. 105 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1997).
143. Id. at 197-98.
144. Id. at 198 (citing to Imbrogno v. Chamberlin, 89 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1996) and Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 1336, 1339 (5th Cir. 1990),
both of which can be read for the proposition that following state law on
damages means reversing awards that lie outside prior state "precedents" on
damages).
145. See Lucht v. Youngblood, 221 S.E.2d 854 (S.C. 1976). This case makes
clear it that, under South Carolina law, comparability of an award with other
awards is only one factor in determining the reasonableness of a verdict and not
a very important one in light of the facts of the individual case:
The appellants assert this verdict exceeds any amount previously
awarded in similar cases which have received the approval of appellate
courts, and that such fact should be persuasive in determining whether
284 [Vol. 51
2003] THE END OF TRIAL DAMAGES 285
. Outside of diversity, difficult questions arise whenever
state law is borrowed to determine rights and liabilities for
federal causes of action. Many of these causes of action do
not allow for jury trial, so that the issue of comparability
functions to second-guess the trial judge's assessment of
damages without regard to any jury. In fact the Erie
doctrine applies to federal questions, if the source of the
right is state law.'46 For instance, Erie governs under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.147 However, Erie's application is
limited to the extent that it undermines federal substantive
policies.148 Where these lines should be drawn can be
difficult to determine. Not surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit
has held that the Erie doctrine is not violated in a Federal
Tort Claims Act case, even when the state whose law is
borrowed does not permit comparability review. In Jutzi-
Johnson v. United States,'49 Judge Posner explained:
[A] practice of consulting damages awards in comparable cases for
purposes of facilitating a more thoughtful, disciplined, and
informed award in the particular case [is not] the same thing as a
rule limiting awards within a range set by previous cases, one
understanding of the state law rule involved in Gasperini: an
award of damages was not to "deviate materially" from awards
that had been made in comparable cases. Nor is it easy to
characterize a practice of not consulting comparable awards as a
remedial rule, hence "substantive" in the Erie sense, rather than
as a rule of evidence; or a practice of such consultation by a
reviewing court endeavoring to carry out its duty to prevent
abuses of discretion in the award of damages as anything more
than a rule of appellate procedure. So on multiple grounds, what
the award is excessive. The comparison approach is helpful and
sometimes forceful, however, each case must be evaluated as an
individual one, within the framework of its distinctive facts.
Id. at 858 (citation omitted).
146. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983)
(discussing the process of borrowing state statutes of limitation); Nice v.
Centennial Area Sch. Dist., 98 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying
state law to determine the fairness of a minor's settlement of a federal civil
rights action).
147. Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1993)
(applying state law in a Federal Tort Claims Act action to determine whether to
give effect to the ruling of an intermediate appellate court).
148. For instance, in actions under the Federal Employers Liability Act
("FELA"), federal principles govern damages. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493 (1980); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 152 (declining to
borrow state statute of limitations due to impact on federal policy).
149. 263 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001).
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indeed appears to be the rule in Illinois, that comparable awards
for pain and suffering are not to be considered at either the
appellate or the trial stage ... does not bind us in this case.15o
The breadth of the Seventh Circuit's language shows its
reluctance, even in the face of contrary state law, to jettison
comparability review. 5' More important than that, the
forgoing discussion reveals that when comparability review
is imposed on damages for intangible losses, it arbitrarily
caps those damages. When damages are capped by judge-
made procedures, it constitutes de facto legislation that has
never been vetted by the political process.
C. The Empirical Debate
As applied, comparability review is arbitrary; if nothing
else, its one-way direction in the federal system threatens
systematic errors of under-compensation. Nonetheless,
proponents of behavioral law and economics have mounted
a research program to justify the practice. In order to
understand their critique, it is helpful to note the
background assumption undergirding it. They claim that,
due to defects in human decision-making, fixing damages
for intangible losses should not be left to the trial process.
While most of the empirical studies generated by this school
constitute a concerted attack on juries, they also discredit
trial judges; at a deeper level these reports rest on a
particular conception of what should count as a rational
choice and how it should affect legal rules, processes, and
institutions.
Ironically, behavioral law and economics is a critique of
law and economics, while it simultaneously retains the
150. Id. at 760 (citations omitted).
151. In fact, in a later unpublished opinion, Chesler v. Trinity Indus., Inc.,
2001 WL 1593142 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2001), the court characterized Jutzi-
Johnson as "leaving open" the question whether comparability review applies in
diversity actions. Id. at *3. Jutzi-Johnson has been consistently followed by the
district courts of the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Ascherman v. Catt, 2003 WL
1562213 *5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 26, 2003) ("Juries are not required to explain their
determinations of damages for pain and suffering, but the Seventh Circuit
requires district judges to provide such explanations with citations to
comparable cases when awarding damages for pain and suffering or similar
difficult-to-quantify categories of damages.").
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conception of rationality central to it. 5' To behavioralists,
understanding law on standard economic grounds is
insufficient for it does not account for the way humans fail
to reason in economic terms."3 Law may inadequately
realize the goals of economic efficiency, if it is subject to
defects in human cognition. Furthermore, law and
economics arguments may not go far enough, for they do
necessarily entail insulating legal decisions from
democratic majorities.'
Based on works in cognitive psychology, critics have
identified a series of fallacies (or biases) that humans
allegedly exhibit. Some of the most famous are the
hindsight bias, where one views what has already happened
as inevitable and miscalculates the risk that harm might
result from a state of affairs;55 framing, where the manner
in which a problem is presented affects the choice made in
response to it;56 the sunk cost phenomenon, where the
investment of time, money or other resources causes a
choice that would not be made without the prior
investment; 7  overconfidence, where one inaccurately
assesses the chances one could be wrong;'58 anchoring,' Y
where one makes insufficient adjustments from an initial
starting value when estimating quantity or degree;
salience, where vivid information is weighed more heavily
than other information; and risk aversion, where whether
the same item is involved, one values the gain or loss of it
differently. 6 °
152. See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 13-16; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1919-
29.
153. See Hampton, supra note 12, at 195-98.
154. This is the real meaning of the constant references in the literature to
populism. See generally Jolls et al., supra note 1; Sunstein et al., Assessing
Punitive Damages, supra note 2; David Schkade et al., Deliberating About
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1150 (2000).
155. See SCorr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
35 (1993).
156. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
157. See PLOUS, supra note 155, at 203.
158. See Roger C. Knoll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 331 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
159. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 453 (1974).
160. This is also called the endowment effect, "whereby the value of a good
increases when it becomes part of a person's endowment." PLOUS, supra note
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These phenomena count as defects in reasoning because
they deviate from rationality on the economic model. 6 As
Cass Sunstein explains:
We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed
memories. People can respond sensibly to these failings, thus it
might be said that people sometimes respond rationally to their
own cognitive limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs
and error costs. To deal with limited memories we make lists. To
deal with limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts
and rules of thumb [heuristics]. But even with these remedies, and
in some cases because of these remedies, human behavior differs
in systematic ways from that predicted by the standard economic
model of unbounded rationality. Even when the use of shortcuts is
rational, it can produce predictable mistakes. The departures from
the standard model can be divided into two categories of judgment
and decision-making. Actual judgments show systematic
departures from models of unbiased forecasts, and actual decisions
often violate the maxims of expected utility theory.'62
What runs through many of the studies described below is
the suggestion that the "inconsistency" in trial awards for
intangibles comes from fallacious reasoning, not from real
differences in the cases to be compared.
As Wissler, Hart, and Saks note,'63 the general ability of
juries to accurately make decisions has long been criticized
by anecdotal evidence, despite an early report by Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel that shows a significant correlation
between the conclusions of trial judges and the conclusions
of juries. While the current assault on jury decision-making
sounds many of the themes of previous critics, the
contemporary debate has been infused with supposedly
neutral empirical studies showing that jury verdicts are
155, at 96 (citing Robert Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,
1 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 39 (1980)). Others include the conjunctive
fallacy, stereotyping, attribution errors, and social influences. See Mitchell,
supra note 1, at 1923-25; PLOUS, supra note 155, at 174, 191.
161. As Amartya Sen describes, economic theory envisages people as
"rational fools." See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 4 (1989).
162. See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 14-15.
163. See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decision-making About General Damages:
A Comparison of Jurors, Judges and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 753-74
(1999). See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.
REV. 1055 (1964).
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particularly inconsistent in the area of punitive damages
and intangible losses."'
Before looking more closely at these studies, it is useful
to note some global concerns. Lee Epstein and Gary King
have recently made the provocative charge that what
passes for empirical research in law does not follow the
well-established canons of empiricism itself.165 Among other
problems, studies reported in law reviews violate the
canons that one's research methodology be sufficiently
detailed so that it can be replicated by others; use too few
data; cull data from nonrandom groups;.6 make fallacious
inferences from that data when summarizing it; present
conclusions with too much certainty; do not account for
rival hypotheses;"' are often funded by entities, such as
corporations, with agendas that are not disclosed; 8 and do
not reveal the normative values underlying the research. As
they describe the situation:
[T]he current state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed.
We base this claim primarily on a review we conducted of the legal
literature-a review that revealed many proceeding with research
agendas, however diverse their goals might be, with little
awareness of, much less compliance with, the rules of inference
that guide empirical research in the social and natural sciences.
The sustained, self-conscious attention to the methodology of
empirical analysis so present in the journals in traditional
academic fields ... that is, the articles devoted to methodology in
these disciplines-is virtually nonexistent in the nation's law
reviews. As a result, readers learn considerably less accurate
information about the empirical world that the studies' stridently
stated, but overly confident conclusions suggest.
16 9
Nonetheless, studies of juries abound in the nation's
law reviews.7 ' Those that attack the adequacy of juries to
164. See, e.g., Baldus Study, supra note 22, at 115-18.
165. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2002).
166. Id. at 38, 99-106, 112-13.
167. Id. at 76-78.
168. Id. at 6.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The
Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); Neil
Vidmar, The Performance of the Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 849 (1998); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic
2003] 289
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
assess damages for intangible losses rarely use data from
jury deliberations in real cases; instead they attempt to
mimic jury processes by constructing artificial juror
responses through surveys and questionnaires, or even the
simulation and abstraction of Jury functions through the
creation of "statistical" juries."' This is a serious flaw, for
other studies show that human decision-making in real life
differs from the decisions made by the very same people
when they are forced to make judgments artificially.17 To
simplify the research, these investigations abbreviate facts
from the controversies and give little context to
respondents. Few of the reports allow participants to
deliberate together. 73  To explicate the nature and
implications of these investigations, I concentrate here on
the Baldus Study... and the Sunstein/Schkade Studies,175
which are critical of juries, and the Wissler Study, which is
not.
The Baldus Study argues for an increase in
comparability review of nonpecuniary damages, but under a
regime that would make that review more reliable by
developing criteria for similarity and a database of cases to
be compared. The major empirical and normative
assumptions underlying the Baldus Study are open to
serious question.176 Moreover, it makes no attempt to
Damages in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal
Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1993); Wissler et al., supra note 163.
171. See, e.g., Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 170; Vidmar, supra note 170;
Vidmar & Rice, supra note 170.
172. As Scott Pious describes this problem:
Another limitation of judgment and decision research is its reliance on
laboratory experiments conducted with college students. As valuable as
these studies are, laboratory tasks do not always involve the same
decision processes found in naturalistic environments. For example,
Ebbe Ebbeson and Vladimir Konecni ... found that municipal and
superior court judges arrived at actual bail decisions very differently
than they arrived at simulated bail decisions.
PLOUS, supra note 155, at 258 (citing Ebbe B. Ebbeson & Vladimir J. Konecni,
Decision-making and Information Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail,
32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805 (1975)).
173. The striking exception is the "severity shift" study, but even here
participants were only allowed to deliberate for half an hour. Schkade et al.,
supra note 154, at 1150.
174. Baldus Study, supra note 22.
175. See generally Schkade et al., supra note 154; Sunstein et al., Assessing
Punitive Damages, supra note 2.
176. See Baldus Study, supra note 22, at 1265 (discussing the remarks of
Advisory Panel Member Larry S. Stuart, Esq.)
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address the claim that damages for mental distress and
pain and suffering cannot be compared in principle. Finally,
a prime consideration for the authors is redressing the
under-compensation that occurs when children have
suffered catastrophic injury.'77 Thus, additur is a goal of the
research; however, this is not possible in the federal courts
where additur is unconstitutional. In the federal system,
comparability review can only produce asymmetric results,
reducing awards that are outside the range of any given
sample of cases making up the similarity grouping.
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel
Kahneman, have conducted studies funded by the Exxon
Corporation that critique jury awards of punitive
damages.'78 These studies are relevant to the discussion
here because the authors count punitive damages as
involving determinations of intangible items, and because
they argue that their results apply not just to punitive
damages but to compensatory damages for nonpecuniary
harms.79 Their first study was a survey of the individual
questionnaire responses of 899 jury-eligible adults in Texas
and Arizona. Participants were asked to assess punitive
damages based on short written descriptions of hypothetical
cases." The second was an investigation of the performance
of 500 mock juries using 3,000 jury-eligible adults. It was
designed to gauge the effect of the deliberative process on
results.' Both studies incorporate theories of cognition and
group dynamics from the behavioral sciences.
The first investigation asserts that punitive damage
awards are inconsistent and out of control8 2 and aims to
identify the causes of these phenomena. However, the
authors give virtually no statistical evidence to back up
these claims and instead rely on anecdotal reports.'
Nonetheless, they argue that the data shows there is "a
177. Id. at 113-15.
178. See Schkade et al., supra note 154, at 1139 n. aaal; Sunstein et al.,
Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2071 n. dddl. Exxon's sponsorship
is disclosed in footnotes and no attempt is made to account for the appearance
of bias that this factor might produce.
179. See id. at 1142-43, 1145-46; Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive
Damages, supra note 2, at 2074, 2080, 2125.
180. See Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2074-
81.
181. See Schkade et al., supra note 154, at 1139.
182. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2075-76.
183. Id.
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remarkably high degree of moral consensus on the degrees
of outrage and punishment that are appropriate for
punitive damage cases,"'84 but no consensus on the damages
needed to appropriately express outrage or to punish.'85 The
investigation attributes this discrepancy to the fact that
translating the decision to punish into dollars involves an
unbounded scale, so that jurors have no modulus for
converting their moral assessments into monetary values.'
Rather than exploring ways to help jurors perform this
conversion process, they conclude that, "[o]ur study raises
serious doubts about whether jurors are able to make
sensible judgments about dollar awards in cases in which
market measures are unavailable, and it throws into sharp
relief the question whether this task ought to be given to
judges or to some other institution."'87 One of the most
provocative suggestions is that the job of awarding damages
simply be given over to experts. This proposal is
unwarranted given the scarcity of evidence the authors
muster to support their claims and the methodological
limits of their study, limits they concede:
[1It is necessary to emphasize that these findings do not replicate
the real world of punitive damage awards. Ours was an
experimental study, and our juries consisted of individuals who
were given brief narrative descriptions of cases. They were not
presented with full accounts, much less with adversarial
arguments on both sides. These arguments could introduce
additional variance; they could tend to reduce disparities. The fact
that lawyers on both sides can typically exclude certain jurors may
reduce the degree of variance in the real world of awards ....
Moreover, our "juries" did not deliberate. 188
In fact more than simple empiricism is at work here, for the
authors take it as their task "to raise some questions about
the appropriate domain of populist elements in the legal
system." 8 This agenda is at the forefront of their second
investigation, which purports to yield findings about the
value of jury deliberation.
184. Id. at 2077-78.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2078.
187. See Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2 , at 2143-
44.
188. Id. at 2109.
189. Id. at 2079.
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Based on the decisions of their mock juries, who were
allowed to deliberate for only one half hour,1 9° the authors
charge that the data shows a "severity shift." By this they
mean that when the median of participants' individual pre-
deliberation assessments of punitive damages are compared
to the group judgment, the group judgment is more
extreme; it is higher when the group's members had
individually given a high punishment rating, lower when
their punishment rating was low.' Across the board,
deliberation increased dollar amounts.9 2 The authors
conclude that "[w]ith respect to dollar awards, 19 3Jury
deliberation substantially increased unpredictability."
Although they concede that these phenomena are less
notable when the mean is the reference (i.e., the average of
pre-deliberation individual results is taken, not the median,
which is typically lower) and that a larger jury number also
reduces variability,'94 the authors account for their results
by positing a phenomenon they call "rhetorical asymmetry."
According to this notion, when jurors make damage awards
within a normative framework, they err on the side of its
preferred norms. 9 For the authors, this is not something to
be welcomed, but reflects the jurors' illegitimate desire to be
well thought of by their peers. Rhetorical asymmetry is a
dubious concept and masks the normative choice that, in a
case of doubt, we should not err in favor of morality.
Moreover the authors muster no empirical evidence to show
that rhetorical asymmetry really exists. They assert that
jury deliberation actually exacerbates the variability they
previously observed in their first study; thus, reliance on a
deliberative process cannot remedy the phenomena of
unpredictability. However, like the consensus observed on
moral judgments, they concede that juries "can use
punishment rating scales quite reliably."' 96 Rather than
being an argument for retaining the role of the jury, this is
further evidence that experts ought to take over the actual
conversion of punishment into dollar amounts.
190. Schkade et al., supra note 154, at 1149.
191. Id. at 1139-40.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1141.
195. Id. at 1161-63
196. Id. at 1169.
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In contrast, the study by Wissler, Hart, and Saks is
critical of prior empirical investigations calling for
comparability review. First, they point out that most
investigations do not compare jury performance to anything
else, most notably to the performance of judges.'97 If the
decisions of judges about the worth of nonpecuniary losses
are no different or more consistent than the decisions of
juries, there should be no reason to opt for a system of
judge-enforced comparability. Moreover, where there is a
general verdict, researchers cannot separate the portion of
the award that is for intangible harms from the portion that
compensates tangible ones.' 98 Another criticism is that the
criteria of similarity are simply too crude to capture salient
differences that juries consider.199 If juries are making
nuanced determinations of the complex and interconnected
effects of injuries on a claimant's whole life, these
judgments cannot be captured by simplistic comparative
models. As the authors note, over-compression of multi-
factorial phenomena dilutes the explanatory power of the
model."' Finally, it is surprising to note how many studies
give little relevance to legally significant differences in
individual cases. When injuries are extracted from their
context and compared as fungible items although the
claimants have dissimilar characteristics, such as age,
employment, and gender, then differences that ought to be
considered by the fact-finder are simply excluded by the
study.20 ' This creates a false impression of inconsistency in
awards. As Wissler, Hart and Saks explaines: "[w]e
[certainly] should not mistake the limitations of the studies
for the limitations of juror decision-making."2 2
The Wissler study attempted to overcome some of these
methodological shortcomings by comparing the decisions of
197. See Wissler et al., supra note 163, at 761.
198. Id.
199. See Baldus Study, supra note 22, at 1139-53 (using a ranking system
that does not specify the standards for selecting points of comparison or the
number of points that are needed to make the fit between cases close enough to
call them similar). For instance, the Blumstein, Bovbjerg, and Sloan study
relies on the Severity of Injury Scale of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. This is only a nine-point scale that ranges from a rating of one
for emotional injury to a nine for death. Blumstein et al., supra note 20, at 190-
91.
200. See Wissler et al., supra note 163, at 760.
201. See id. at 761.
202. Id.
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juries with those of judges and attorneys. Their results
showed a surprising consistency between the evaluations of
all participants. Ironically, the determinations of jurors andjudges were most strongly correlated, while the
assessments of defense counsel were least correlated. °3 The
investigation did show that juries have difficulty
translating a finding of intangible injury into a particular
dollar amount, but it also indicated that jury deliberation
reduced this effect, as did giving juries access to amounts
prayed for by plaintiffs. 24 The authors concluded that a
simple solution to the problem of varied awards would be to
reintroduce the twelve-person jury.0 5
The Wissler study makes important use of the role ofjudges. However, many others do not. In the investigations
that attack the competency of juries, the silence on the role
of trial judges speaks volumes. Recall that when an appeal
is taken from a jury award on grounds of excessiveness, the
award has usually survived a defense motion for new trial
or remittitur. This means that the trial judge has not found
the award unreasonable. Moreover, many of the cases
imposing comparability review in the federal system involve
causes of action where no jury trial is available, so that the
trial judge's direct assessment of damages is being
attacked, not a jury's. It is even more striking that
behavioralists generally have nothing to say about the
possibility that fallacious reasoning infects the decisions of
appellate judges2 6  and technocrats. In fact, serious
cognitive defects might undermine the activities of both
groups. Three of the most obvious are anchoring, framing
effects, and overconfidence.
Anchoring distorts decisions when individuals are
asked to make a judgment about amounts by reference to a
figure they are required to initially consider in estimating a
quantity.' Studies suggest that people make insufficient
203. See id. at 804, 813
204. Id. at 801-04.
205. See Wissler et al., supra note 163, at 816.
206. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903
(2002) (describing how judges uses cognitive short cuts to dispose of cases to
reduce their dockets).
207. For instance, Scott Plous gives the example of persons being asked to
estimate the percentage of African countries that are in the United Nations.
When asked if the percentage is smaller or larger than sixty-five percent, the
respondents judge the real number to be lower. When asked to give their actual
estimate, they give the figure of forty-five percent. However, when the starting
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adjustments upward or downward from a beginning
number. This number, even when purely arbitrary, will
skew the final judgment made. This can distort the efficacy
of comparability review at the appellate level, where very
little information about the facts of cases is available. If the
first few verdicts selected for comparison are low, thejudgment of the appellate tribunal should be unjustifiably
anchored by these amounts. Conversely, if the initial
samples are large, the very same damage figure is likely to
be viewed as acceptable. As the choice of awards to consider
and in what order is arbitrary, there is no provision to
counteract the inaccuracies produced by anchoring.
Framing exacerbates the problem. According to this notion,
the judgment one makes regarding a situation can be
dramatically affected by the way the question to be decided
is posed."°8 Due to the one-way nature of remittitur, the
question for the appellate court will be whether the award
is too large in light of the comparative sample, not the more
neutral inquiry of whether it is reasonable in light of the
facts of the actual case.
In addition, overconfidence may be a particular problem
with federal appeals courts. This defect stems from people's
inability to accurately judge whether they are in error."'
Interestingly, overconfidence is an equal problem with
persons of high intelligence and, with few exceptions,
experts exhibit it as much as lay people.210 However, there is
an important distinction between groups with regard to the
problem. Studies suggest that overconfidence is a function
of gender and age, with males and older people being more
biased by overconfidence than women or young people.21
The federal judiciary, and particularly the federal appellatejudiciary, is overwhelming male and older. 12 We can infer
that overconfidence is a greater problem there than at trial
standard is ten percent, most respondents judge the number to be too small. Yet
when asked to give their actual estimate, they respond with the figure of
twenty-five percent. PLOUS, supra note 155, at 145.
208. RICHARD THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 27 (1991).
209. See PLOUS, supra note 155, at 219.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 226 ("This does not mean that overconfidence rates were
random.... Two-thirds of all highly confident respondents... were male even
though the general sample was split evenly by gender... and 80% were more
than 30 years old.").
212. See Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for
Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 117-128 (1999).
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where the pool of jurors and judges is more representative
of the population and contains a significant number of
women. Finally, arguments based on trial irrationality
ignore that appellate decisions are group efforts just as jury
decisions are. Why should we assume that appellate panels
are any less subject to phenomena such as the severity shift
or are any less likely to be socially influenced by group
think and a desire to be thought well of by their judicial
peers?
These problems infect the decisions of technocratic
experts as well. Behavioralists want to shift to a system of
bureaucratic rationality in order to remove decisions
regarding tort compensation from democratic processes.
But, some of the greatest errors produced by fallacies such
as the sunk cost effect, group think, the conjunctive fallacy
and similar mistakes have been committed by experts, who
have given us policy decisions like the Bay of Pigs, the
Challenger accident, obsolete car design in Detroit, and
numerous other blunders creating untold inefficiencies and
human misery.'23 Moreover if the notion of agency capture is
at all correct,"' administrative experts can be influenced by
the very entities they are charged to regulate, producing
not only mistaken, but corrupt, results. When all the flaws
in the research favoring comparability review are
uncovered, these studies provide little reason to adopt the
radical changes in the default position on damages that
they advocate.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL INCOHERENCE OF COMPARABILITY
REVIEW
The actual practice of comparability review is crude and
the empirical studies in favor of it are flawed. But, one
should not reject comparability review solely due to the
challenge of implementing a workable system. Instead, its
problems stem from its conceptual foundations.
Comparability review is rooted in utilitarianism. As such, it
ignores the competing norm of corrective justice, 15 but even
213. Plous gives these as examples of irrational expertise. See PLOUS, supra
note 155.
214. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and Regulatory Competition: Can
They Co-Exist?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1734 (2002).
215. Again, the notion of corrective justice focuses on redressing an
individual plaintiffs loss by requiring adequate compensation from the wrong-
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in its own terms, it cannot justify a legitimate system of
appellate review that compares awards for intangible losses
across cases.
A. Injuries in Context: Of Identity and Goals
The most serious intangible losses, usually ones
associated with acute, even horrific, physical injuries, can
transform personal identity. They create a revolution in
one's very sense of self, as well as in one's relation to family,
work, and the larger society. This is because personal
identity involves nested and dynamic structures that
interact in mutually reinforcing ways. Those structures
include biological, psychological, and social components that
undergo synergistic changes. To make things more complex,
even paradoxical, individuals are agents of their own
identities as they seek the experiences and perform the
actions that allow them to express the sort of persons they
wish to be. This is possible because personal identity is self-
reflexive.216 In fact, personal identity is so complicated,
hierarchical, and dynamic a phenomenon that it is
irreducible for purposes of utilitarian calculation.217
The question of how we form and maintain our sense of
unique self-hood over time despite numerous physical and
doer. It assumes that persons have a pre-existing entitlement, to, for instance,
bodily integrity, and that when that entitlement is violated, morality requires
that the claimant be restored as close as possible to his or her pre-wrong
position. See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIz. L.
REV. 15, 15-27 (1995).
216. This trait of self-reflexiveness, the "first-person perspective," is the
definitive mark of personal identity, given our material embodiment. See LYNNE
RUDDER BAKER, PERSONS AND BODIES: A CONSTITUTION VIEW 5, 76 (2000).
What marks a person off from everything else in the world, I shall
argue, is that a person has a complex mental property, a first-person
perspective that enables one to conceive of one's body and mental
states as one's own. We humans are animals in that we are constituted
by animals, but, having first-person perspectives, we are not "just
animals." We are persons.
See id. at 5.
217. Another more technical way of expressing this is that damages to
personal identity cannot be accounted for in utilitarian terms because they
cannot be expressed in linear fashion, i.e., in terms of a von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function. See John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the
Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF
WELL-BEING 255, 255-57 (Jon Elster & John E. Roehmer eds., 1993).
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psychological changes is a philosophical puzzle.218  As
philosopher Terrence Penelhum describes it:
One of the commonest of daily experiences is that of recognizing
our friends. A less common, though still fairly familiar experience
is the decision that a certain person is or is not the person he
claims to be. The problem of personal identity is that of clarifying
the principles behind these indispensable processes of
reidentification. To reidentify someone is to say or imply that in
spite of a lapse of time and the changes it may have wrought, the
person before us now is the same as the person we knew before.
When are we justified in saying such a thing and when are we
not?219
The complexity of personal identity has been evident
from the inception of the debate over how to answer these
questions."2 First, philosophers disagree over what the
question of personal identity really is, and what sub-issues
are entailed by it. Are we seeking to account for our sense of
self, our ability to pick humankind from other things, our
ability to individuate one human from another, our ability
to reidentify someone as the same person they were before,
or all of these things?221 For the purposes of this discussion,
I include all questions and meanings of personal identity.
This is justified because the legal system includes them as
well.2
218. See John Perry, The Problem of Personal Identity, in PERSONAL
IDENTITY 3, 5-6 (John Perry ed., 1975).
219. Terrance Penelhum, Personal Identity, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 95 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
220. The modem genesis of the problem of personal identity can be traced to
the Seventeenth Century and John Locke's work, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 1 (Scholar Press 1970) (1690). As Harold Noonan describes:
"John Locke gives the problem of personal identity its first clearly identifiable
formulation in the famous chapter 'Of Identity and Diversity' in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding." Harold W. Noonan, Locke on Personal
Identity, in JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING IN
Focus 210 (Gary Fuller et al. eds., 2000).
221. See Penelhum, supra note 219, at 95-96; see also Amelie Oksenberg
Rorty, Introduction, in THE IDENTITY OF PERSONS 1-4 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty
ed., 1976). For instance, Lynne Rudder Baker distinguishes the questions,
"what am I," from "what is a person" and "what is a human being" although she
concedes there is a connection between the first question and the second
question. See BAKER, supra note 216, at 5, 91.
222. Legal issues of identity for purposes of allocating criminal
responsibility and the like do not turn on arcane questions of analytical
philosophy, but instead deal with the problem of identity at a higher and less
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Much of the difficulty stems from our insistence on
determining the identity of persons, not just physical
entities.223 What are the criteria for this most unusual of
things, the identity of persons? What factors can account for
the unity of self over time? Since the era of Locke224 and
Hume,22" the debate has been over whether mental or bodily
continuity is the essential feature of the self. Many
philosophers now recognize that a "person" is a
demanding level of description. For instance, it is not a good defense to a
criminal prosecution for the defendant to raise the philosophical problem of
strict identity and argue that she cannot literally be the same entity that
perpetrated the alleged offense, because She, occupied a different point in space
and time at the moment the crime was committed than She2. For a discussion of
the difference between strict numerical identity and qualitative identity, see
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 201-02 (1984).
223. As Amelie Rorty explains:
Why are we interested in someone being the same person, and not
merely the same human being or physical object? One reason is
primarily retrospective: we need to know whom to reward and whom to
punish for actions performed when "they" were acknowledgedly
different in some respects from the present population. But we have
more forward-looking reasons as well: we want to know what traits
remain constant so that we can know what we can expect from the
persons around us. We assign crucial responsibilities to individuals,
assume important continuing relations to them in the belief that
certain of their traits are relatively constant or predictable. And for
ourselves, we are interested in our own identity because we make
choices that will affect our futures: we set in motion a train of actions
whose consequences involve "our" well-being, without knowing whether
we shall have, in the future, the desires and beliefs that now direct our
planning.
Rorty, supra note 221, at 4-5.
224. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 335-
37, 340-45 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1979) (1690).
225. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 187-218 (Peter H.
Nidditch ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1888). Hume averred: "[W]hat we call a mind, is
nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by
certain relations, and supos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect
simplicity and identity." Id. at 207. As Penelhum describes Hume's view:
We fail, he said, to distinguish properly between two things, the 'idea of
an object that remains invariable and uninterrupted' through 'a
supposed variation of time' (which is the prototype of identity) and 'the
idea of several different objects existing in succession and connected
together by a close relation'.. . . Sooner or later, however, philosophers
arrive on the scene and notice the recurrent paradox in which men
have thus evolved their thinking. They see both that we do ascribe
identity to changing things and that we have no apparent ground for
doing this. The result is that since they cannot find such a ground, they
invent one.
See Penelhum, supra note 219, at 99.
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psychophysical being.22 This is important, for it shows the
close connection between one's physical and mental well-
being and the symbiotic way in which each affects the
other. It coheres as well with the unexpressed premise of
the law that damages are recoverable for pain and suffering
and other intangible harms caused by physical injury.
Moreover, the charge that memory-based accounts of
identity are incomplete for they have paid insufficient
attention to the bodily aspect of our beings can and should
be extended one step further. One can argue that a purely
psychophysical model is also inadequate, for it does not
account for the social aspects of the self.
228
It has become a postmodern truism that the self is to a
degree a social product, i.e., our values, world views, roles,
desires, goals, actions and the like are in some sense a
function of the social setting in which we are born and
reared.229 From this perspective, our personal identities are
a function of the sociality in which we are embedded.
However, theorists differ over the extent to which
personhood is determined by the social environment.3 o In
226. See, e.g., SYDNEY SHOEMAKER, IDENTITY, CAUSE, AND MIND 106, 131
(1984) (arguing a connection between the embodiment of persons, the typical
manifestation of mental states in behavior of the body, and the possible
necessary truth that the existence of persons requires embodiment).
227. See DOBBS, supra note 50, at 652.
228. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989); see also
MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998). Consider
these words of Taylor's:
I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks
[social contexts] is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put, that the
horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense of them
have to include these strong qualitative discriminations. Moreover, this
is not meant just as a contingently true psychological fact about human
beings, which could perhaps turn out one day not to hold for some
exceptional individual or new type.... Rather the claim is that living
within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human
agency, and that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to
stepping outside what we recognize as integral, that is, undamaged
human personhood.
TAYLOR, supra, at 27.
229. See generally JEFF COULTER, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MIND
(1979); KAREN HANSON, THE SELF IMAGINED (1986); Kenneth J. Gergen, The
Social Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology, 40 AM. PSYCHOL. 266
(1985).
230. This controversy is much of what has animated the liberal-
communitarian debate. See Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of
Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 313 (1985).
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the realm of political philosophy the claim that the self is
largely a social artifact is hotly contested between rights
theories premised on individualism231  and strong
communitarian theories that give a primary role to the
group in the formation of identity.2 32 Choosing either side of
the dichotomy-the individual or the society-seems
unwarranted, for either extreme leads to absurdity. 33 Some
of the most grievous challenges to a tort victim's sense of
self come from interactions with the outside world. Thus,
the best accounts of personal identity combine mental,
material, and social elements.
Our common forms of speech and our literature confirm
these intertwined mental, bodily, and social traits. Consider
an example from one of the great works on alienation and
identity, Franz Kafka's short story, The Metamorphosis.2"4
Kafka's novelette symbolizes a host of values and meanings,
but The Metamorphosis is also a masterwork on the
question of personal identity.235 It reveals critical things
about our sense of self, and how it is that we can say and
understand assertions like, "[a]fter the death of her child,
231. See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM (1962).
232. See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 63-70
(1989).
233. For instance, libertarian political theories posit an asocial, atomistic
rational entity as the basis of all value. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA (1974). Although we have no reason to believe such an entity ever
existed, given the insights of anthropology, sociology, and history, theories that
hold the self is almost completely determined by society provide no logical space
for the phenomenon of personal agency and cannot account for dissidents or the
emergence of critical social movements that question the status quo. See
KYMLICKA, supra note 232, at 9, 63-70.
234. See FRANZ KAFKA, The Metamorphosis, in FRANZ KAFKA, THE COMPLETE
STORIES 89 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 1972).
235. These values and meanings include a critique of middle-class
capitalism, see Bluma Goldstein, Bachelors and Work, in THE KAFKA DEBATE,
NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR OUR TIME 147, 156-58 (Angel Flores ed., 1977); an
autobiographical and Oedipal struggle between a weak son and a brutal father,
see KURT J. FICKERT, FRANZ KAFKA, LIFE, WORK, AND CRITICISM 19-20, 26 (1984);
the uncertain role for Jews in pre-World War II European society, see RITCHIE
ROBERTSON, KAFKA: JUDAISM, POLITICS AND LITERATURE 1-37 (1985); and the
classic existentialist plight of human beings who find themselves trapped in a
mortal life with no escape, searching for meaning in a universe with no one but
themselves to provide it. But see generally Christian Goodden, The Prospect of a
Positive Existential Alternative, in THE KAFKA DEBATE, NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR
OUR TIME 100 (Angel Flores ed., 1977) (arguing that Kafka's existential position
is not unalterably negative and despairing).
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Mary has not been the same person," or "[s]ince he lost his
sight, John hasn't been his old self. O6
The story begins with one of the most famous first lines
in literature and presents one of the most complete physical
insults to anyone's sense of identity: "As Gregor Samsa
awoke one morning from uneasy dreams, he found himself
transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect."237 From the
very outset we know that Gregor is the "same" person, and
yet not. The story takes as given that Gregor retains a
unity of consciousness. He knows who he is despite the
radical change in his body: "What has happened to me? he
thought. It was no dream. 2 1 In the opening scenes, he
spends his time looking at his new body, trying to move,
and at the same time musing on the vocation he has chosen.
This is one of the compelling aspects of Kafka's writing, for
the horror of Gregor's bodily transformation is juxtaposed
with mundane musings on the tedium of his everyday life.
But, while mental continuity is present, the extreme
physical change he has undergone immediately affects his
ability to relate to his family, his employer, and the outside
world, transforming the social aspects of his identity.
His family, which had always taken for granted that
Gregor would be the uncomplaining breadwinner, stands
outside his bedroom door, prompting him to get up and go
to work. He tries to communicate, but cannot; as Kafka
describes the scene:
That gentle voice! Gregor had a shock as he heard his own voice
answering hers, unmistakably his own voice, it was true, but a
persistent, horrible twittering squeak behind it like an undertone,
which left the words in their clear shape only for the first moment
and then rose up reverberating around them to destroy their
sense, so that one could not be sure one had heard them rightly.
Gregor wanted to answer at length and explain everything, but in
the circumstances he confined himself to saying: 'Yes, yes, thank
you, Mother, I'm getting up now.'
239
Gregor manipulates his cumbersome new body and
attempts to get ready for work, a hopeless task. Eventually
236. Parfit argues that these statements are meaningful, rather than
inconsistent, because they exploit the difference between qualitative and strict
identity. See PARFIT, supra note 222, at 201-202.
237. See KAFKA, supra note 234, at 89.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 91.
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the chief clerk shows up to determine why he has not left on
time and after a series of tragi-comic attempts, the door is
opened and he is revealed to all.2 4' Gregor's family recoils in
horror at the sight of him, but still "recognizes" the gigantic
insect as Gregor himself.241 All characters in the story
acknowledge a bodily continuity to him, but one that
profoundly changes Gregor's personality and preferences.242
As time goes on, Gregor becomes more insect-like
desiring to eat things he never would have eaten before. 43
He is content to hide under the sofa, and eventually
develops a liking for crawling on the walls and ceiling with
his newfound ability to stick to surfaces.244 Nonetheless,
vestiges of the old Gregor remain, for when his sister and
mother begin to remove his furniture, he tries to prevent
them from taking the things he loved most in his old life.2 5
Convinced that he is violent, Gregor's father attacks him as
if he were an insect to be killed and injures him seriously.
After this event, his family relations become more dire.
Gregor listens to his parents and sister talking and
observes that his changes have wrought profound changes
in them as well. They are all working, though in
humiliating jobs, and do not rely on him as before. His
identity as breadwinner is lost and he feels this loss keenly.
His memories haunt him and remind him of what once was,
241but is no more.
240. Id. at 100.
241. Id.
242. See ALLEN THIHER, FRANZ KAFKA: A STUDY OF THE SHORT FICTION 42
(1990).
243. KAFKA, supra note 234, at 105-07.
244. Id. at 114-15.
During the daytime he did not want to show himself at the window,
out of consideration for his parents, but he could not crawl very far
around the few square yards of floor space he had, nor could he bear
lying quietly at rest all during the night, while he was fast losing any
interest he had ever taken in food, so that for mere recreation he had
formed the habit of crawling crisscross over the walls and ceiling. He
especially enjoyed hanging suspended from the ceiling; it was much
better than lying on the floor....
Id.
245. See id. at 117-119.
246. See KAFKA, supra note 234, at 125.
Gregor hardly slept at all by night or by day. He was often haunted by
the idea that the next time the door opened he would take the family's
affairs in hand again just as he used to do; once more, after this long
interval, there appeared in his thoughts the figures of the chief and the
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Eventually Gregor's health declines, due to this injury,
his depression, his social isolation, perhaps his bodily
change itself. The story leaves all of these factors as
tantalizing possibilities. Things become so bad that his
family wishes for him to disappear. As his sister puts it,
"My dear parents .... Perhaps you don't realize that, but I
do. I won't utter my brother's name in the presence of this
creature, and so all I say is: we must try to get rid of it. 247
Gregor decides to oblige and remains true to the most
persistent feature of his former self: his willingness to
sacrifice himself for his family.248
While The Metamorphosis is only a story, it has lessons
for understanding intangible losses. The nature, extent, and
meaning of Gregor's pain and suffering, his mental anguish
at his predicament, the emotional distress he feels over the
transformation in his relations, are a function of the
negatively synergistic mental, physical, and social aspects
of his new being. The social context, if not his social
relations, continues, but the meaning of these elements has
shifted, so much so that Gregor has lost many of his old
preferences and replaced them with new ones. His identity
as the family breadwinner was no longer possible. Goals
that he may have had-to marry, or to find a better job-
cannot be realized.
Gregor's story should provoke us to ask whether his
situation could plausibly be reduced to an individual utility
function and somehow compared with the utility functions
of others devastated by events beyond their control.
Although the "injury" to Gregor Samsa is so catastrophic as
chief clerk, the commercial travelers and the apprentices, the porter
who was so dull-witted, two or three friends in other firms, a
chambermaid in one of the rural hotels, a sweet and fleeting memory, a
cashier in a milliner's shop, whom he had wooed earnestly but too
slowly-they all appeared, together with strangers or people he had
quite forgotten....
Id.
247. Id. at 133.
248. As the story portrays his demise:
He thought of his family with tenderness and love. The decision that he
must disappear was one that he held to even more strongly than his
sister.... In this state of vacant and peaceful meditation he remained
until the tower clock struck three in the morning. The first broadening
of light in the world outside the window entered his consciousness once
more. Then his head sank to the floor of its own accord and from his
nostrils came the last faint flicker of his breath.
Id. at 135.
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to be supernatural, it is not hard to imagine physical
injuries so disfiguring, debilitating, or inconsistent with a
victim's goals as to make the victim feel horribly trapped in
a life no longer her or his own.
To carry forward the idea that intangible losses cannot
be simply compared across cases, consider the real example
of "Jonathan I.," the painter who became colorblind and
whose story is recorded by neurologist Oliver Sacks in his
book, An Anthropologist on Mars.249 This account shows that
comparability is not just a problem with catastrophic
harms. In fact, lesser injuries can be assimilated to more
serious ones through the connection between personal
identity, personal well-being, and our goals.
An injury that may seem less harmful than another can
still have profound effects on a person's life to the extent
that it affects that individual's ability to pursue goals. At
the extreme end of the continuum, catastrophic harms
make almost any goals impossible and work the greatest
negative change in one's sense of self. At the other end of
the spectrum, an injury may be so trivial that it cannot in
principle affect anyone's aims. Injuries in between might
not threaten one's very sense of self, but are still not
captured by utilitarian comparison, because their
significance must be relativized to the impact they have on
the nested and hierarchical goals that make up a person's
life-as Joseph Raz would explain, on one's short-range,
intermediate, or long-range goals.25 ° Thus, where a
particular harm might fall in respect of a particular person
will still be a function of the unique mental, physical, and
social elements of that individual's actual life. The
experience of Jonathan I. exemplifies this.
Jonathan I. was injured in a relatively minor car
accident. He was diagnosed with a concussion, but, as a
result of the accident, he totally lost all sense of color." 1
Jonathan I. had been a successful artist and was sixty-five
when the accident occurred.25 '
249. See Oliver Sacks, The Case of the Colorblind Painter, in AN
ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 3 (1995).
250. See generally JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (analyzing
how goal-directed behavior affects liberty and social forms).
251. See Sacks, supra note 249, at 3.
252. Dr. Sacks described the devastation this "minor" injury worked as
follows:
"You might think," Mr. I said, "loss of color vision, what's the big deal?
306 [Vol. 51
20031 THE END OF TRIAL DAMAGES 307
According to Dr. Sacks, the loss of his sense of color so
profoundly affected Jonathan .'s life that he had difficulty
driving, dressing, and even eating.253 Color television was a
torture, he stopped visiting museums,2 4 and his enjoyment
of music was affected because he had experienced music as
a "rich tumult of inner colors."255 Although Dr. Sacks
observed that others who lose their sense of color report
similar feelings of dislocation and disgust and have
difficulties maneuvering in a colorless world, Jonathan I.'s
reaction was special:
Mr. I, with his heightened visual and aesthetic sensibilities, found
these changes particularly intolerable ... color perception had
been an essential part not only of Mr. I's visual sense, but his
aesthetic sense, his sensibility, his creative identity, an essential
part of the way he constructed his world-and now color was gone,
not only in perception, but in imagination and memory as well.
The resonances of this were very deep.
2 56
But, as time passed, Jonathan I.'s artistic personality,
work, and even life preferences changed. He began to paint,
and paint successfully, in black and white. He became a
night person, and he expressed pity for those who had no
perception of the different world that had opened up to him.
When a chance for a cure was offered, he rejected it. As Dr.
Some of my friends said this, my wife sometimes thought this, but to
me, at least, it was awful, disgusting." He knew the colors of
everything, with an extraordinary exactness (he could give not only the
names but the numbers of colors as these were listed in a Pantone
chart of hues he had used for many years). He could identify the green
of van Gogh's billiard table in this way unhesitatingly. He knew all the
colors in his favorite paintings, but could no longer see them, either
when he looked or in his mind's eye .... It was not just that colors were
missing, but that what he did see had a distasteful, "dirty" look, the
whites glaring, yet discolored and off-white, the blacks cavernous-
everything wrong, unnatural, stained and impure.... Mr I could
hardly bear the changed appearances of people... any more than he
could bear his own appearance in the mirror: he shunned social
intercourse and found sexual intercourse impossible. He saw people's
flesh, his wife's flesh, his own flesh, as an abhorrent grey.... This was
so even when he closed his eyes, for his vivid visual imagery was
preserved but was now without color as well.
Id. at 6-7.
253. Id. at 8.
254. Id. at 10-11.
255. Id. at 11.
256. Id. at 34-35.
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Sacks put it: "Now that he conceived the world in different
terms, and again found it coherent and complete, he
thought the suggestion unintelligible, and repugnant. Now
that color had lost its former associations, its sense, he
could no longer imagine what its restoration would be
like." '257 How could comparing the injury of Jonathan I. with
someone else's injury in an allegedly similar case possibly
capture this strange, but true, tale? Was he worse off
because he was an artist? Better able to adapt due to his
former artistic talent? Or was his story only comprehensible
and compensable in terms of just that, a narrative,
experienced directly by the trier of fact?
To be legitimate, comparability review should make
interpersonal comparisons of tort victim's internal states at
the highest level of description and complexity, i.e., of how
those states both constitute and change the personal
identities or goals of the individuals to be compared. The
conceptions that could capture these phenomena must be
correspondingly rich, multi-dimensional, dynamic, and
synergistic. But, it is difficult to see how harms to such
multivariable and mobile entities as personal identity or
life goals could be statically reduced to the same metric.
Moreover, the malleable nature of personal identity
suggests that one's preferences do not remain stable over
time. The often tragic and self-conscious realization that
one is not the same person as before, that the script one had
made for oneself cannot be realized, suggests that people
value the status quo ante more than conditions post hoc,
and give a special emphasis to their pre-tort personalities.
This, in turn, indicates that the movement from pre- to
post- tort assessment is not transitive. These features have
negative consequences for comparability review, not just in
practice but at its theoretical core.
B. Utilitarianism and Comparability Review
Comparability review is utilitarian. It crudely maps the
feelings of different tort victims on the same scale of value.
Recall the court's assertion in Joan W. that, "[t]he
emotional distress and trauma claimed by Joan W. were not
qualitatively more severe than that claimed by the four
257. Sacks, supra note 249, at 39.
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plaintiffs in Mary Beth G. or by Maria Levka., 258 The
empirical studies follow this theme, by arguing that human
anguish can be compared across persons by reducing their
individual situations to a limited set of factors. Yet
utilitarianism cannot interpersonally compare the
nonpecuniary well-being of individuals in a plausible
fashion. Due to this defect, it cannot realize the normative
goals that giving damages for intangible losses serve.
Before proceeding, this claim needs to be clarified and two
obvious objections to it should be considered.
1. A Clarification. The relation between utilitarianism
as an ethical philosophy and utilitarianism as the
foundation of modern economics is both complex and
contested.259 To radically simplify, ethical utilitarianism
imposes a moral duty on us to make social arrangements
that bring about the greatest happiness (utility) for the
greatest number of society's members.26 ° This allows us to
sacrifice the happiness261 of an individual, if the sacrifice
produces a net increase in society's happiness overall. In
contrast, economics finds the notions of "happiness" difficult
to measure and it conceives of utility descriptively, as (in
one sense) the "value of an expected cost or benefit." '262
258. Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1985).
259. See generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory, in II. LAW AND ECONOMICS 103 (Jules Coleman and Jeffrey Lange eds.
1992) (arguing that the modern definition of efficiency' is not necessarily
founded in utilitarianism, which sacrifices individual utility in the name of
group welfare, but is better defined in terms of wealth maximization, which can
be connected to the norms of liberty and the social contract). But see Jules
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, in II. LAw AND
ECONOMICS, supra, at 520-48 (arguing that defining efficiency in terms of wealth
maximization instead of utility, puts one on the horns of a dilemma-either one
must assert an entirely implausible account of consent to loss or one must fall
back on an instrumentalist defense of wealth maximization, which [in my view]
takes one dangerously close to utilitarianism).
260. See 1 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 227 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).
261. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 23
(1988). " 'Utility' is a slippery concept that means different things in different
contexts. Usually it is just means 'preference ranking' [the canonical economic
account], but sometimes it means satisfaction, welfare, happiness or ever
pleasure." Id. Whether utilitarianism allows utility to consist in happiness,
desires, satisfaction, or preferences is contested with preference measurement
as perhaps the common, but most controversial, understanding of utility. See
Weymark, supra note 217, at 299.
262. See Posner, supra note 19, at 11.
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Moreover, economics generally takes as given the existing
state of wealth distribution. At the ground level, economics
distances itself further from morality by purporting to
describe (rather than prescribe) rational choice between
alternatives. But, even the values that are overtly promoted
by normative economics are allegedly noncontroversial, for
normative economics does not tell us what ends to promote;
instead, it merely informs us about what the alternative
costs of different ends might be, or, assuming a consensus
on social ends, the most efficient means to realize them.26
This is disingenuous, for the most pragmatic notion of
efficiency in modern economics-Kaldor-Hicks-involves
sacrificing the utility of individuals in order to maximize
the wealth of society and treats wealth as the ultimate
good.264 This is a significant normative judgment.265 Even
Judge Richard Posner, perhaps the most influential law
and economics theorist today, acknowledges the connection
between technical conceptions of economic efficiency and
utilitarian ethics, although in his view, it is a by-product of
wealth maximization:
What, in short, is the philosophical basis of the Kaldor-Hicks
concept corresponding to the utilitarian basis of Pareto
superiority? One answer is that the things that wealth makes
possible ... are major ingredients of most peoples' happiness, so
that wealth maximization is an important.., social instrument of
utility maximization. This answer ties efficiency to
utilitarianism. 
266
263. Id. at 14.
264. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, in II. LAW AND ECONOMICS
191 (Jules Coleman and Jeffrey Lange eds. 1992).
265. Kaldor-Hicks conceptions treat a change in states of affairs as
economically efficient when the putative defendant's conduct creates a net
increase in wealth, even if the victim were compensated for his or her loss. The
problem is that compensation is not given. The moral justification for using
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is that we can treat potential victims as impliedly
agreeing in advance to such a conception of efficiency, because they would
presumably agree to exchange their loss by their share in society's increased
wealth. See Dworkin, supra note 264, at 508. By these moves, the adherents of
wealth maximization hope to elude the sacrifice problem (among others) in
utilitarianism, as well as the problem of converting personal utility functions
into a general social utility function. For a longer discussion of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency see infra text accompanying notes 306-09.
266. Id. at 15.
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Because I believe that the attempts to recast economic
efficiency in terms of wealth maximization do not
successfully elude utilitarianism,267 I will subsume them
under my analysis of utilitarianism. And, in reality, it is
impossible to erect an impermeable barrier between
"utility" in its philosophy sense and "utility" in its economic
sense. Moreover, in the legal system, the nuanced
differences between the various meanings and contexts of
utility are rarely noted. This is particularly true of the
requirement that intangible losses be compared across
cases. Thus, I intentionally blend here both the philosophic
and economic meanings of utility-if this seems an
unwarranted conflation of two unique concepts, it is
justified by the conflated nature of comparability review
itself.
2. Some Obvious Objections. There are two important
objections to my criticism of the utilitarian foundation of
comparability review. The first is that utilitarianism is so
rich a theory that it can account for any aspect of human
experience up to and including the normative realm of
human existence, i.e., that it can value how we value our
values. 269 Assuming that we understand the experiences
involved in intangible loss, this more sophisticated engine
of utilitarian comparison will be sufficient to account for
them and allow for meaningful comparability of damages
across cases.
The second objection is reductionist. Its proponents
would assert that the strict conditions of economic analysis
267. See Dworkin, supra note 264, at 522-25.
268. Throughout the remainder of this discussion I will use the term
"desire" to refer to the more substantive conception of utility, and "preference"
to refer to the notion of ranking.
269. This is the kind of argument that is supported by higher order versions
of utilitarianism that go beyond determining the consequences for utility of
individual acts undertaken by individual actors. One important example is rule
utilitarianism, wherein utilitarian calculation is taken to a second order to yield
a set of rules that can trump individual utility calculations as a reason for
action in the particular case. Another example is demonstrated by "ideal
observer theories" that bring in the notion of an omniscient, empathetic, and
impartial observer of all individuals' utility functions whose own utility function
goes proxy for the ordering of theirs. This raises judgments of social utility to
the level of ethical claims. For a detailed analysis of the former see DAVID
LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 136-60 (1965); for a discussion of
the latter see J.C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955).
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discipline our assessment of group welfare by reducing
utility to its objective manifestations. These manifestations
are best identified by our preferences revealed through our
choices. Economists define these choices by those things for
which we are willing to pay. 270 In this way dollars go proxy
for value. 271 In regard to nonpecuniary harms, the argument
is that it makes sense to select the most material features
of cases for evaluation-for instance, physical injuries, or
out-of-pocket payments-and to de-emphasize in the
calculation more elusive factors, such as the effect of an
injury on a plaintiffs personal identity.
The first objection involves so much tinkering with the
fundamentals of utilitarianism, the use of so many deus ex
machina like the device of the Ideal Observer, that it is fair
to question whether these theories are utilitarian at all.272
The second objection has two defects that erode its critical
force. It is too reductionist. Anything that cannot be
measured in dollars or seems more substantive than
preferences drops out of the utility calculation. '73 Moreover,
this approach is nothing more than a tautology, '74 for it
means by definition, that we value whatever we prefer and
we prefer whatever we value. When this tautology carries
normative weight, the problems are magnified. 275
270. See WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS, AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS 7 (3d ed. 1999).
271. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 261, at 23-26.
272. For an interesting discussion of the ideal utilitarianism of G.E. Moore
and Hastings Rashdall and whether they should count as utilitarian theories at
all see GEOFFREY SCARRE, UTILITARIANISM 114-22 (Ted Honderich ed., Routledge
1996).
273. See Daniel Kahneman & Carol Varey, Notes on the Psychology of
Utility, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, 127-29 (Jon Elster &
John E. Roehmer eds., 1991) (paperback ed., 1993).
274. See Lebenstein, supra note 10, at 100.
275. As Arthur Leff has explained the problem of this tautological aspect of
utilitarianism even when desires, not just preferences, are used:
If human desire itself becomes normative (in the sense that it cannot
be criticized), and if human desire is made definitionally identical with
certain human acts, then those human acts are also beyond criticism in
normative or efficiency terms; everyone is doing as best he can exactly
what he set out to do which, by definition, is "good" for him. In those
terms, it is not at all surprising that economic analyses have
considerable power in predicting how people in fact behave.
See Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of the Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 458 (1974) quoted in HIRSCH, supra note 270,
at 7.
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For utilitarianism to be reflective of the human form of
life, it must include all significant human experience,
including subjective mental and physical states. In more
technical terms, and as John Weymark and others have
shown, utilitarian ethical, political, and economic theories
must yield utility functions that are cardinally unit
measurable and comparable.276  This means that the
substantive amount of utility, not just preference rankings,
must be determined and compared across persons.
Finally, because the actual calculations of comparability
review are exceedingly rough and simplistic, I will argue for
my claim by looking at utilitarianism in its simplest form,
coming back to these more complex issues and objections as
needed. 278
3. The Core Commitments of Utilitarianism. Regardless
of modern variations, at bottom all utilitarian theories rest
on a certain set of assumptions. Joseph Raz has
characterized those assumptions as follows: (1) the reasons
for or against an action are functions of its consequences;
(2) all reasons are comparable; (3) evaluation of
consequences must be agent-neutral; (4) right actions
minimize negative consequences and maximize positive
ones; (5) preferences transparently establish the positive or
negative character of consequences; and (6) omissions to act
count just as much as actions themselves in calculating
utility.
276. See Weymark, supra note 217, at 303.
For utilitarianism to be a meaningful doctrine, it is necessary that the
same social ordering be obtained for all vectors of utility functions in
the information set .... As a consequence, utilitarianism is meaningful
if utility satisfies cardinal unit plus comparability. Utilitarianism is
not meaningful if utility is only ordinally measurable, even if utility
levels can be compared .... An implication of these remarks is that the
third interpretation of utility. . . does not provide an adequate
foundation for utilitarianism. Recall that in this interpretation, utility
is regarded as measuring preference.
Id. at 303-04.
277. This is exactly what I deny in the case of assessments of intangible
losses.
278. Jules Coleman has argued that certain conceptions of efficiency closely
related to or even entailed by utility, e.g., Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency can actually be argued for on nonutilitarian grounds, that is, on the
basis of liberty or contractarianism. See Coleman, supra note 259, at 513-14,
518-20, 532-34, 540-48.
279. See RAZ, supra note 250, at 268-71.
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In his classic work, A Theory of Justice,28 ° John Rawls
observed that utilitarianism ignores the separateness of
persons. 8' What did he mean by this? One way to
understand it is to pose this question: to what are we each
entitled under a utilitarian system? Most simply, it is to
have our utility count along with the utility of all others
toward how changes in states of affairs affect the overall
condition of the group.282 Counting here means subsuming
everyone's desires under the same metric to reach net social
utility.
This way of treating people assumes that they are
morally significant only as bearers of utility.' Agent-
neutrality comes from detaching preferences and desires
from the particular person who experiences them. Then
they become free-floating value units that are traded off
against the free-floating value units of others. The
preferences and desires that people feel do the heavy lifting
in utilitarianism, while their individual separateness as
persons ceases to be morally significant in all other
respects.
According to law and economics,284 the deep structure of
torts can be explained in terms of maximizing social utility
by way of economic efficiency. 85 This ignores alternative
values, such as corrective justice. Nonetheless, to the extent
that we prevent or deter certain conduct, we do so not to
vindicate an extra-social, individual right of the victim but
because we conclude that our policies maximize utility
overall.288 Rights protection, such as it exists, is a by-
280. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (paperback ed. 1971).
281. Id.
282. See SCARRE, UTILITARIANISM, supra note 272, at 14-16. In a wealth
maximization account of efficiency, our right would simply be to have our
willingness to pay a certain price for a commodity recognized. See Dworkin,
supra note 264, at 497.
283. See RAWLS, supra note 280, at 26, 90, 187 n. 37.
284. It is important here to distinguish between pure law and economics
and behavioral law and economics. This is because, according to behavioralists,
mainstream economics does not factor into its analyses the work of cognitive
psychology on human decision making. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI
RATIONAL ECONOMICS 243-244 (1991) (paperback ed. 1994).
285. See Coleman, supra note 259.
286. This follows from the fundamental utilitarian precept that individual
utility functions are to be summed to yield the net social utility of a particular
change in states of affairs. However, it can also be expressed in the concept of
an "externality," a cost imposed by another person on the holder of a property
right or entitlement outside the market, i.e., in the absence of voluntary
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product of utility maximization. Under this view, the law of
torts87 commodifies all aspects of human bodily and mental
experience.288 Learned Hand's well-known formula for is
negligence brings this home,289  for it rests on the
assumption that unless the probability of the cost to the
victim from a defendant's actions exceeds the cost the
defendant would have expend to prevent the risk, the
victim's injury is not compensable. 29" The basic idea is that
the aggregate utility of the group is maximized by allowing
the behavior to occur without compensation, although the
welfare of the victim is sacrificed, sometimes catastrophi-
cally. Full compensation might deter would-be defendants
from engaging in risky, but valuable, activity. Society
benefits from some level of risky behavior and attempting
to prevent all risk would be inefficient. Compensation is
required when, all other things being equal, the probable
cost to the victim is greater than the cost to the defendant
of preventing the risk. In that case the defendant's
behavior has created a net disutility.y9 By forcing the
defendant to pay the victim fully the law prevents a
negative externality.292 Modern microeconomics has tried to
axiomatize these principles. It is at this point that the
normative value of maximized social utility is connected to
competing definitions of efficiency. This is an area of
controversy in normative economics.293 It is interesting to
see how these concepts map onto the legal rules that have
been developed for tort compensation.
Intuitively, determining whether and how much to
compensate ought first to require analyzing the victim's
pre- and post- accident personal utility functions cardinally,
that is determining how much total utility the victim
exchange, and the law's varying responses to the methods for dealing with such
externalities. See HIRSCH, supra note 270, at 18-19.
287. See id. at 142-43.
288. This is because the notions of efficiency that are used derive from the
model of voluntary exchange transactions. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 12-14.
289. Behavior is negligent when the burden of preventing harm (B) is
greater than the probability that harm will occur (P) times the severity of the
injury (L), i.e., when B < PL. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 147-51.
290. See HIRSCH, supra note 270, at 143-44. Hirsch notes that Hand's
formula is "utilitarian." Id. at 132 n.9 (citing to H. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV.
L .REV. 40 (1915)).
291. HIRSCH, supra note 270, at 143-44.
292. Id. at 137.
293. See Weymark, supra note 217, at 303.
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possessed in the status quo ante and in the status post hoc.
Then, that would be compared to the change in cardinal
amounts of all other members making up the relevant
group, also in respect of the status quo ante and post hoc.294
Interpersonal comparison of utility is a step used to derive
the final social utility function.29 However, economists have
found these conditions too restrictive. Assessing qualitative
inner states like desires,296 and then trying to aggregate
them, does not follow the summing process that
utilitarianism ultimately requires.297 Moreover, showing
that it is possible to compare these things is difficult for
internal states seem in principle to be incommensurate.
Focusing on the requirements of cardinality and
comparability reveals the limitations of utility's generic,
catch-all quality. Economics has developed two refinements
to remedy these difficulties-that the preferences of
individuals revealed by their choices mark more
substantive internal conditions and that preferences can be
ordinally ranked, making it easier to determine utility
interpersonally by inspecting ordinal rankings. The most
significant and influential expression of these ideas was the
notion of Pareto efficiency.298
294. Proponents of wealth maximization as the foundation of efficiency
would dispute this, for their emphasis on libertarianism and contractarianism
would theoretically obviate the necessity of the summing process. In my view,
as wealth maximization is more plausibly an instrumentalist than an ulimate
value, I doubt that that the problems of interpersonal comparison can be so
easily solved. See Coleman, supra note 259, at 434-36.
295. And, interpersonal comparisons cannot be avoided by reference to
principles that treat social utility as somehow greater than the sum of its parts.
"The third principle of normative economics is that judgments of the overall or
social goodness of economic outcomes depend solely on the corresponding set of
individual evaluations of individual welfare and not, for example, on an organic
concept of society or the state." See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 708 (Douglas
Greenwald ed., 1982).
296. See SEN, supra note 161, at 17-24.
297. It is difficult to prove that they yield results that comply with the
linearity demanded by the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function. In fact,
there are numerous counterexamples tending to show that the more qualitative
and rich the definition of utility is, the less likely that the aggregation principle,
at the core of utilitarianism, can really be satisfied. See Hampton, supra note
12, at 208-10.
298. This account of efficiency was propounded by the Italian
economist/sociologist Vifredo Pareto. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, TEN GREAT
ECONOMISTS, FROM MARX TO KEYNES 129 (1951) (stating that Pareto's new idea
was to "replace utility postulates by postulates about observable behavior and
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Pareto efficiency defines the concept on the model of
voluntary exchange transactions.299 Under this theory, a
move from one state of affairs to another (an exchange) is
Pareto superior, if at least one person is better off, i.e.,
would rank the resulting state ordinally higher, and no
person is worse off as a result.00 A move is Pareto
indifferent, if in respect of the persons involved, they have
no preference between either of two states of affairs."1
Pareto optimality exists when, in a particular circumstance,
there is no change possible where at least one person is
better off, and no one is worse off, i.e., "society has reached
the utility possibility frontier."3 2 Efficiency in Pareto terms
is promoted by Pareto superior moves to an ideal state of
Pareto optimality. Paretian concepts might explain the
choice to compensate a victim for injuries due to another's
negligence.
If a defendant's conduct creates a state of affairs that is
Pareto inferior, i.e. no one is better off and at least one
person is worse off (ranks the status post hoc lower in terms
of ordinal preference), then to restore pre-accident
conditions, compensation must be given."' This is as if the
defendant had purchased the right to be negligent from the
victim. But while the allied concepts of Pareto superiority,
optimality, and indifference have been powerful, many
economists view them as too restrictive.0 A system that
thus to base economic theory on what seemed to Pareto to be more secure
foundations"). See generally CHARLES H. POWERS, VILFREDO PARETO (1987).
299. Another advantage of using this model is that it blunts the effects of
transaction costs. Transactions costs can be defined as those costs associated
with preventing or removing an externality. Under the Coase theorem,
transaction costs become a dominant concern, if the claim is not justified that
the parties will bargain to an efficient outcome when there is conflict over an
entitlement. As Hirsch states:
Transaction costs economics considers transactions as the basic unit of
analysis and focuses on aligning them with alternative modes of
governance, e.g., markets and departments, with the objective of
economizing transactions costs .... With the help of transaction cost
economics many economic phenomena can be reformulated as
contracting problems.
See HIRSCH, supra note 270, at 11.
300. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 153-54
(1990).
301. See Weymark, supra note 217, at 265-271.
302. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 261, at 49-50.
303. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 176-77.
304. See Coleman, supra note 259.
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requires legal rules to produce changes from the status quo
that are always Pareto superior, gives potential victims a
veto power over conduct, for in order to trade off the utility
of one person, to benefit another, compensation must be
paid. Finally, where a change makes some people worse off
and others better off, the Paretian system cannot easily net
the effects and so treats them as Pareto indeterminate. °5
But most changes in social policies, including legal rules,
create winners and losers.
To redress some of these concerns, another concept of
efficiency has evolved: Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 3 According
to this idea, a transfer in value from one person to another,
even if involuntary, is efficient if it creates such an increase
in social wealth that the winner could compensate the loser
fully and still retain a surplus. This is the notion of wealth
maximization. The important point is that compensation is
not actually paid.307 Therefore, the loser cannot veto policies
that might benefit the social group overall (i.e., veto his/her
own sacrifice), and the surplus value can more readily inure
to the benefit of society. For example, when under Hand's
formula a victim need not be compensated, this result can
be explicated as an expression of a legal rule that roughly
fits the criteria of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Under this
account, the tort system is assimilated to the model of
contract and the dynamics of voluntary exchange.0
Proponents of this view are keen to argue that it can be
morally justified in terms of liberty and the social
contract.3J 9. This is also permissible in utilitarian terms,
once again, because it is the net welfare overall of the
relevant social group that is the aim, and all we are
individually entitled to have our own personal utility
functions factor into that calculation. However, Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency is still parasitic off of Pareto superiority
and depends just as much on revealed preferences. Thus, it
305. See KREPS, supra note 300, at 153-154, 175. ("The Pareto criterion,
however, is incomplete in two respects. First, it does not allow comparisons
between social states when one or more persons gain at the expense of others;
and second, it does not identify the best or optimal, social state among those
available."). See also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 295, at 709.
306. This is sometimes also called the "potential Pareto rule." See POSNER,
supra note 19, at 12-13.
307. See id.
308. See SCARRE, supra note 272, at 153.
309. See Posner, supra note 19, at 479-83. But see Coleman, supra note 259,
at 526-40.
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really only solves the veto problem of Paretian conceptions
of efficiency.
Theorists like Amartya Sen argue that restricting the
concept of utility to revealed preferences is unjustified
because it does not comport with the human form of life.31°
Others argue that these theories, being concerned only with
allocative efficiency are normatively incomplete because
they make no provision for judging whether the pre-existing
allocation of resources in the starting state is fair or just.3
Moreover, efficiency is not a free standing value, but a
means to an end. It does not tell us which objective
functions should be promoted; it does not tell us in aid of
which values efficiency should be enlisted.312 If revealed
preferences are the best candidates for such values,
preference-based efficiency and its more technical
incarnations seems circular. These global and conceptual
objections are serious. However, there are other problems
that arise when the utilitarian/economic conception of law
is applied in actual cases. These problems are magnified
dramatically when comparability review of damages for
intangible loss is imposed.
Consider a simple automobile accident where the
victim, Doe, is injured by the negligent driving of Roe.
Assume that prior to the accident Doe enjoyed good physical
health, owned a car with a fair market value of $18,000,
and worked at a job providing hourly compensation. As a
result of the accident, Doe's car is destroyed and she suffers
a compound fracture of her leg that requires a hospital stay
and generates out-of-pocket medical expenses of $25,000.
Doe is also off work for six weeks, and so loses income. Doe
completely recovers from her accident, except for a slight
limp that makes it impossible for her to run or play tennis
as she used to do. There are several ways the law should
respond.
First, in finding Roe negligent, the law concludes that
the benefit of his activity is not justified by the cost to
Doe.113 Roe's behavior is neither Kaldor-Hicks nor Pareto
310. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 317 (1977).
311. This is one way of understanding John Rawls' device of the maximin
principle in A Theory of Justice. See RAWLS, supra note 280, at 30-33.
312. See HIRSCH, supra note 270, at 8.
313. This is akin to the idea "that utilitarianism should judge actions to be
right or wrong, not on the basis of their individual impact on the public utility,
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efficient. Thus, Roe must compensate in a manner that
mimics a voluntary market transaction. But, few people
would consent in advance to be injured as Doe has been,
even for a price.314 Economics overcomes this difficulty by
taking the analysis to a higher level of abstraction and by
making a series of restrictive assumptions. These include
that an individual's preferences remain stable,315 that they
are independent of other factors (non-relative),316 and that
the failure to gain an opportunity is the same as a loss.1 7
Following these suppositions, Doe's condition before and
after the accident is transitive, so long as full compensation
is awarded and Doe herself acts "rationally" on her
preferences. These assumptions are not especially
problematic (at least at first blush) insofar as the property
losses, lost wages, and out-of-pocket medical expenses are
involved.
We presume that as a rational chooser, Doe is Pareto
indifferent as to whether she regains her car just as it was
before the accident, or is given dollars equal to its fair
market value. Problematically for law and economics,
empirical studies of consumer preferences show that people
do not charge the same price to give something up as they
would to obtain it anew. 1' This is the phenomenon of risk
aversion and is treated as a departure from rationality
under the economic model. 19 Worse yet, it appears that in
real life, people's preferences are not independent of
context, but are relativized to circumstances and so violate
the principle of transitivity that is so important to
aggregating utility functions.20 Finally, there is little
reason to believe that people's preferences remain stable.32'
but by reference to the utility of the general performance of actions of their
kind." See SCARRE, supra note 272, at 122.
314. See Hampton, supra note 12, at 197-99.
315. See Becker, supra note 50, at 14.
316. This is captured by the concern for dominance and transitivity. See
PLOUS, supra note 155, at 81.
317. The notion of opportunity costs conveys this idea. See COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 261, at 35 (citing an example from R. RUFFIN & P. GREGORY,
PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 156 (2d ed. 1986)).
318. This phenomenon is frequently referred to as the "endowment effect."
See THALER, supra note 284, at 8, 28.
319. See GARY W. HOHE & HAL R. VARIAN, EXERCISES AND APPLICATIONS OF
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 116-24 (3d ed. 1993).
320. See KATZ, supra note 50, at 35.
321. See Henry H. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard,
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What if as a result of the accident, Doe's fundamental
preferences in regard to cars and driving have changed?
What if she is now so fearful of another accident that only a
replacement car that is much more safe and expensive than
the car she lost will get her back on the road?
These kinds of problems increase exponentially when
intangible losses are involved. First, what kind of market in
pain and suffering, and disability should be considered
when referring to Doe's rational preferences in terms of
intangible losses? Are we to presume that she is Pareto
indifferent to a world in which she can substitute chess
playing for running, or participation in the local book club
for a tennis game? When the law goes further and insists
that any trial award given her for intangible losses must fit
within a range of awards given in other cases, the
limitations of the economic model break under the strain of
providing the comparability that is required.
Comparability review of intangible losses is utilitarian
but it cannot avoid the problems of cardinal unit
measurability and comparability by using revealed
preferences. This is because comparability review presumes
to rest on similarity, not ordinality, of interior states. It
aims for something richer in determining whether the pain
and suffering, mental distress, and humiliation endured by
different people are truly alike. A decision that the post-
accident intangible welfare of two different victims is equal
implies a substantive judgment as to the traits and
elements of their personal circumstances that are akin to
each other. Otherwise how are we to identify the "likes"
that are to be treated alike? Moreover, the principle of full
compensation, which sees intangible harms as real costs to
be recouped, suggests that a high degree of content
similarity between comparative subjects must be present;
otherwise the comparison will often be inaccurate, thus
inefficient. But this is just where utilitarianism breaks
down most. In its simplistic version, it merely posits that all
states of affairs are susceptible to the same metric, and so it
solves the problem of comparability by a concept with little
explanatory power. In utilitarianism's modern economic
in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 140-41 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (arguing
that the standard economic account of preferences does not consider how the
process of deliberation can change one's needs.and wants).
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incarnations, the problem of comparability is met by
abstracting so severely from the human condition that the
judgments produced have little in common with how people
actually value, think, or live.
III. THE REAL AGENDA: TORT REFORM BY SLEIGHT OF HAND
At a minimum, the foregoing arguments show that
comparability review is problematic. But, despite its
practical and conceptual weaknesses, it still enjoys strong
support in the federal courts and the academy. I suggested
earlier that comparability review masks normative choices
that have little to do with providing a better system of
assessing damages for tort injury. The time has come to
uncover those value choices.
A. As If Comparability
Prima facie, intangible harms are unique, so comparing
them does not treat likes alike. This prima facie feature
cannot be easily rebutted, unless the uniqueness of personal
experience is to be denied. But, this is what the arguments
for comparability really amount to. They actually consist of
the claim that dissimilar injuries should be treated as if
they are alike to promote other purposes. This is a raw
normative choice, but one that is not explicitly justified.
To understand this better, assume for purposes of
argument that the norm of maximized expected utility were
unproblematic. Even given these assumptions, the impact
of comparability review on the personal utility functions of
particular tort defendants is ignored in order to promote a
social utility function whose legitimacy is never justified.
This is critically important. Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell have argued that the concept of optimizing welfare
can be made so rich and nuanced that it can account for all
human experience and valuation, and so it should be a
prime normative standard in law, one even dominating
rights claims.322 But the movement from assessing one
person's welfare to assessing society's welfare, as Sen and
others have pointed out, is not a process of simple
aggregation. All personal values and experiences making up
322. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 HARv. L. REV. 961 (2001).
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the utility of particular persons cannot be realized on the
level of the social group; normative choices must be made as
to what objects the social utility function should promote.
As Michael Dorf suggests, here is where the normative
work really takes place; accounts that simply focus on
individual expected utility beg the difficult normative
questions.323 The social effects of treating the personal,
mental, and physical states of disparate people as if they
are comparable when they are not sacrifices the welfare of
tort victims and can produce negative social utility overall.
Treating unlikes as if they are the same actually
violates principles of formal justice. Moreover, because
comparability review in the federal courts forces awards
from unlike cases to be put in line with each other, but only
for the purpose of reducing them, it is inefficient. This is
because it externalizes the costs of a defendant's conduct,
forcing the victim and society to subsidize the activity in
question. Finally, comparability review can increase the
illegitimacy of results, for it treats individual litigants
badly. To understand this claim, it is also useful to contrast
comparability review to the doctrine of preclusion.
Preclusion is relevant to the legitimacy of comparability
review, for it is one of the few circumstances where a
determination in one proceeding binds litigants in another.
For issue preclusion to apply, the issue must be the same
and it must have been actually litigated, actually decided,
and necessary to the judgment.324 These requirements are
imposed to make sure that the party to be estopped has had
a full and fair individual opportunity to litigate the facts in
question. In addition, where nonmutuality of collateral
estoppel is recognized, it is axiomatic that the litigant must
have her or his own day in court on the issue subject to
estoppel; otherwise due process is violated.325 Even if the
party to be precluded was involved in prior litigation, courts
323. See Michael B. Dorf, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to
Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 849-50 (2002).
324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982):
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action
between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
Id.
325. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971).
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impose additional requirements before nonmutual collateral
estoppel applies in order to insure the quality and fairness
of the preceding judgment.326 Consider these tenets in light
of comparability review, which seeks to limit, that is, bind,
a plaintiff to an amount of damages that fits within a range
of other cases in which she did not participate.
These considerations show that not only does
comparability review fail to promote justice and efficiency,
but it injects a host of difficult questions concerning the due
process rights of plaintiffs and it dramatically erodes the
right to jury trial. If comparability review as it is practiced
is arbitrary, if it is conceptually incoherent, and if it
threatens well-established legal norms like due process and
jury trial, why is it so aggressively promoted? The simple
answer is that forcing awards to be compared across cases,
especially when the comparison can only give rise to
remittitur, can produce an immediate reduction in the
overall amount of damages paid by repeat defendants. To
get a feel for the magnitudes involved, consider again
several cases.
In Levka, the damage award of $50,000 was remitted on
appeal to $25,000. In Joan W., the plaintiffs compensation
was reduced from $112,000 to $75,000. In Avitia, the
Seventh Circuit demanded a decrease from $21,000 to
$10,500, again simply cutting the plaintiffs damages in
half. In the trio of birth injury case remitted by the Ninth
Circuit, the trial courts had allowed a total amount of major
damages of $9.2 million; the appeals court remitted that
total to $3.1 million. These cases show a disturbing
pattern. Plaintiffs' damages for intangibles are being
remitted to half of their original recoveries, or less, but no
reasons are given for the figures appellate courts choose. It
is highly unlikely that this uniform tendency to simply cut
plaintiffs damages in half more accurately reflects the
actual losses for each plaintiff. This huge decrease stems
from only a few sample decisions. In reality, comparability
326. Nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel can be declined in the court's
discretion when: (1) the previous litigation involves small stakes; (2) its
procedures were less generous than those in the action where estoppel might
obtain; (3) the litigant is opportunistic and has waited to see the result before
seeking a binding result; and (4) inconsistencies between multiple, related
proceedings occurred, place in doubt the correct resolution of the fact in
question. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 94-108.
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review gives appellate courts carte blanche to second guess
the trier of fact's determination of damages, not on the
basis of long-standing principles, but on the basis of a whole
new criterion that does not really accord deference to the
trial process.
These factors powerfully motivate defendants to take
appeals in order to achieve remittitur, rather than living
with the trial judge's failure to provide it. And, when an
appellate tribunal is called upon to make the comparability
assessment, its actual decision-making process is function-
ally nondeferential, for it simply picks a set of cases as the
comparability sample and makes an "objective" judgment as
to whether the damages under scrutiny fits within the
range. Where a jury is involved, no deference is given to its
determination, for the jury did not have access to the
sample used to equate awards. Thus, the jury's decision to
fix damages at a particular amount is not made in light of
comparative information and cannot logically be given
deference in that context.
In addition to reducing damages in an individual case,
comparability review exerts a steady downward pressure on
awards in the federal courts, because the cases in which
damages are reduced then go into the comparative sample
where their remitted amounts are used to limit damages in
subsequent cases. This was the negative reinforcing
relation between Levka and Joan W. Mrs. Levka's original
award of $50,000 was treated as out of line compared with
the original award of $112,000 to Joan W. But on appeal,
the remitted award in Levka was used as part of the sample
justifying the reduction of Joan W.'s damages to $75,000.
Moreover, the presence of comparability review at the
appellate level inevitably has an impact on the standards
for determining whether remittitur should occur at trial.
The more that damages are reduced on appeal, the more
the range of acceptable awards is established by appellate
cases, the more trial judges will likely engage in remitting
damages in order to avoid reversal on appeal. When these
phenomena are considered in light of the fact that awards
for intangible losses make up a large percentage of the total
damages in tort cases, it is undeniable that the primary
beneficiaries of the process are repeat defendants.
The idea that defendants are found liable too often and
pay too much is a recurrent subtext in much of the
behavioral law and economics research. For instance, critics
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claim that in order to remedy the hindsight bias, burdens of
proof on liability ought to be increased."28 They also argue
"the jury system is an extremely bad institution" for
awarding punitive damages that "optimally deter"
defendants." 9 The message here is that the trial system
punishes defendants too often and makes them pay too
much; once again, this judgment is based on maximizing
social utility. Not content with mounting an assault on the
traditional system of punitive damages, behavioralists also
argue that awards for things like pain and suffering are
only "nominally compensatory" and so probably produce the
same defects as determinations of punitive damages do."'°
Proponents of comparability review extend this critique
across a broad array of cases-libel, environmental
litigation, securities litigation, and the like.3"'
Although the immediate effect of comparability review
is a large reduction in the amount of damages paid by
defendants, this is not its only normative consequence.
Underlying all the assertions that awards for intangible
losses are inconsistent, unfair, and inefficient, is a
particular view of what counts as rationality. The core
claim of the behavioral law and economics school is that
human beings do not make judgments that comport with
the model of maximizing expected utility. Instead of
questioning the model, proponents question human
cognitive capacity. They assume the value of maximizing
expected utility and use it to justify reordering the legal
system. Focusing on the normative model of rationality
behind comparability review reveals the larger project to
establish a regime of experts charged with determining tort
damages in place of trial altogether.
328. See Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 38, 40-41. While the authors note that
hindsight bias might be a salutary antidote to the rationality defect of
defendant overconfidence (under which defendants might produce defective
products because they underestimate the chances of making mistakes), they
conclude that "[we think that defendant overoptimism is much less likely to be
a factor for firms that for individual defendants. .. ." Id. at 39. This kind of
slant in favor of repeat defendants is replete in the behavioral law and
economics literature.
329. See Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2111.
330. See id. at 2131.
331. See id.
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B. Rationality Revisited
It is the recurrent theme of this article that
comparability review not only curbs the power of juries, but
that it usurps the normal trial process. No wonder that the
solution for some is to limit decisions at trial in favor of a
system of technocratic experts. As Cass Sunstein explained:
[A]n administrative or legislative body might create a kind of
"pain and suffering grid," a "libel grid," or "sexual harassment
grid," combining the basic elements of disparate cases into
presumptive appropriate awards. A judge would produce a dollar
award by seeing where the case at hand fits in the grid and
perhaps by making adjustments if the details of the case strongly
call for them. A technocratic approach of this kind could eliminate
or at least greatly reduce the problem of erratic awards. Whether
it is desirable depends on the value of incorporating populist
elements .... 332
But the goal of replacing trial discretion with
technocratic limitations depends on the background
assumption that the only legitimate account of rationality is
maximized expected utility. One of the most revealing
aspects of the behavioralist movement is that it seldom
confronts or defends its own normative choices concerning
reason. This is a critical failing-given the dramatic
changes in the default position on intangible losses they
want, given the radical transformation in the legal
procedures they seek, these critics have a heavy burden to
meet. To discharge that burden, it is incumbent on them to
rule out the possibility that alternative or supplementary
accounts of rationality might vindicate our commitment to
trial as the means to fix damages for nonpecuniary harms.
This is particularly important because behavioralists give
us no reason to believe that the technocrats whose decisions
will be supreme are any less subject to cognitive defects
than juries or trial judges.
It is beyond the scope of this article to canvas all the
theories of rationality that might be brought to bear. To
undercut the arguments for comparability review it is
enough to sketch several of them and to show that they
332. See Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 2, at 2137-
38.
333. This is the essence of the public choice account of legislation and
administrative action. See supra text accompanying note 214.
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might illuminate how rational assessment of intangible
losses is possible in the special context of trial. The first is
the concept of "bounded" or "evolutionary rationality"
developed by Gerd Gigerenzer, Renihard Selten, and
others."' The second is the idea of narrative rationality
advanced by Walter Fischer and others.3 ' Another is the
notion of rational evaluation of incommensurables
described by legal philosopher Joseph Raz.
The term "bounded rationality" is ambiguous and
contested. For the school of behavioral law and economics it
refers to limitations on human rationality, whereas for
Gigerenzer and Selten, it denotes the increased
opportunities for rational decision-making, due to the
conjunction between human cognition and specific contexts
of decision. As Gigerenzer and Selten describe it:
Since the 1970s, researchers have documented discrepancies
between a "norm" (e.g., a law of probability or logic) and humanjudgment.... [T]he blame was put on the human mind rather
than on the norm. The discrepancies were labeled "fallacies," such
as the base-rate fallacy and the conjunction fallacy, and attributed
to humans' "bounded rationality," in the sense of limitations on
rationality. This limitation was put forward in psychology...
experimental economics ... [a]nd law .... Bounded rationality
is... not simply a discrepancy between human reasoning and the
laws of probability or some form of optimization. Bounded
rationality dispenses with optimization, and usually, with
probabilities and utilities as well. It provides an alternative to
current norms, not an account that accepts current norms and
studies when humans deviate from these norms. Bounded
.rationality means rethinking the norms as well as studying the
actual behavior of minds and institutions .... Several of the so-
called fallacies are based on norms that have been put forth
without analyzing the structure of environments. For instance,
what has been interpreted as base-rate neglect turns out to be a
reasonable strategy under plausible assumptions about the
environment. Moreover when information is represented in
334. See generally BOUNDED RATIONALITY, THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd
Gigerenzer & Richard Selten eds., 2001). See also Gerd Gigerenzer & Richard
Selten, Rethinking Rationality, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY, THE ADAPTIVE
TOOLBOX, supra.
335. See generally Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the Law: A
Rhetorician's Invitation to the Legal Academy, 39 DuQ. L. REV. 457, 469-471(2001); Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983);
WALTER R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION: TOWARD A
PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE AND ACTION (1987).
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natural frequencies rather than probabilities, base-rate neglect is
perfectly reasonable. 336
The main idea of their account is that human beings
employ cognitive short cuts, i.e., heuristics that enable
them to make "fast, frugal and accurate" decisions in the
context of regularities occurring in particular environ-
ments.337 Like a baseball player who employs the regularity
of the constant angle of gaze between the player and the
ball, instead .of computing like a machine to make a catch,
humans employ "middle-range" techniques to yield rational
results that make sense in distinct situations. These are
"domain-specific" strategies that do not require unlimited
computational capacity and work because they are
relativized to a unique context.338 As such, they display
rationality in an ecological sense. Most importantly for my
purposes, consistency, coherence, and universality are not
necessary features of rationality on this model:
[T]hese heuristics are fast, frugal, and computationally cheap
rather than consistent, coherent, and general .... [Tlhese
heuristics are adapted to particular environments, past or present,
physical or social. This "ecological rationality," the match between
the structure of a heuristic and the structure of an environment,
allows for the possibility that heuristics can be fast, frugal, and
accurate all at the same time by exploiting the structure of
information in natural environments.
3 3 9
The key insight here is that it is not possible to
determine whether a particular cognitive short cut such as
base rate neglect is rational or not without considering its
usefulness in the context in which it is employed.
Gigerenzer and Selten specifically criticize the behavioral
law and economics school for making just this mistake.340
Rather than asking whether juries and trial judges make
reasonable decisions in the local environment of a
particular trial, they apply the model of computer
intelligence to the trial process and find it wanting. That
336. Gigerenzer & Selten, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY, THE ADAPTIVE
TOOLBOX, supra note 334, at 5-6.
337. Id. at 7.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 9.
340. They specifically point to the study by Jolls et al. as an example of the
misuse of concepts of bounded rationality. See id. at 4.
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the local environment of a particular trial does present
opportunities for rational evaluation in specific contexts is
illuminated by another account of reason, the theory of
narrative rationality.
The concept of narrative rationality is one of holism and
context-dependence. 1 Its basic claim is that to be rational,
evaluation must be anchored in a narrative that makes
coherent sense in a particular context. As David Carr
explains: "[n]arrative is not merely a possible successful
way of describing events; its structure inheres in the events
themselves. Far from being a formal distortion of the events
it relates, a narrative account is an extension of one of their
primary features."'4 Moreover narrative coherence often
provides good reasons for decision:
Rationality is grounded in the nature of persons as narrative
beings, in their inherent awareness of narrative coherence-
whether or not a story hangs together and narrative fidelity-
whether or not the stories they experience ring true to the stories
they know or believe to be true.
343
But comparability review ignores the possibility that
rationality on the model of narrative coherence might be
significant. As the actual practice of comparability review
makes clear, it is abstraction from context that is the
hallmark of the process. To decide whether a particular
award for intangible harms is in fact an outlier from other
awards, trial transcripts are not reviewed and critiqued as
one would review and compare works of literature; instead,
the elements that are plucked out of the context of the
narrative are few indeed: things like the cause of action, the
physical injury, and the amount of money awarded. As
cases like Levka and Joan W. show, not even significant
objective differences in the plaintiffs themselves are
accorded much weight: things like age, gender, or
occupation.344
Finally, it is useful to consider an account of rationality
that takes seriously the idea that large aspects of human
341. See David Carr, Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for
Continuity, in MEMORY, IDENTITY, COMMUNITY 7 (Lewis P. Hinchman & Sandra
K. Hinchman eds., 2001) (paperback ed.).
342. Id. at 8.
343. See Walter R. Fisher, Narration, Reason and Community, in MEMORY,
IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, supra note 341, at 314-315.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 294-309.
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experience cannot be accounted for by utilitarian
calculation. This is Joseph Raz's treatment of
incommensurability. Some theorists hold that the issue of
awards for non-pecuniary harms raises intractable
problems of incommensurability. 45  The concept of
incommensurability is simply that there exists a plurality
of goods, such that some things in principle cannot be
equated on the same scale. Joseph Raz has argued that
incommensurability is a phenomenon to be welcomed, not
ignored, due to its special role in constituting the human
form of life.34 The connection between incommensurability
and the claim that utilitarian calculation cannot provide
the basis for comparing intangible losses is particularly
keen in respect of the problem of transitivity.
What is the significance of Raz's claim that there are
incommensurables? For Raz himself, it provides an
argument that utilitarianism cannot be the only moral
value. But for others, if incommensurability really exists, it
presents a challenge not just to utilitarian calculation, but
to rationality itself. If we cannot determine which of a
number of options ought to be pursued in virtue of their
placement on the same measuring rod, what rational
reasons could we possibly have for choosing between them?
If we cannot compare choices, how can we make them,
except arbitrarily? If intangible losses involve harms to
personal identity or to one's nested goal structures, so that
345. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REv. 779, 845-46 (1994); see also Margaret J. Radin, Compensation
and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993) (arguing that damages for
intangibles are appropriate, because even though they involve
incommensurables, they express community sympathy for the victim).
346. Raz' account of incommensurability is as follows: "A and B are
incommensurate if it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true
that they are of equal value." Raz, supra note 250, at 362. As he points out, this
account encompasses two possible forms of incomparability. The first is that it
is not the case that A or B are better than the other, or of equal value. To
further elucidate his idea, Raz uses the test of transitivity, which
incommensurable options fail. Thus, "[t]wo valuable options are incom-
mensurable if (1) neither is better than the other, and (2) there is (or could be)
another option which is better than one but is not better than the other." Id at
325. In addition to this test, Raz adds a rule of thumb for identifying
incomparables: the "mark of incommensurability" which asserts that two
alternatives cannot be compared if "it is possible for one of them to be improved
without thereby becoming better than the other, or if there can be another
option which is better than the one but not better than the other. . . ." Id. at
325-26.
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linear comparisons between individuals cannot be made,
why isn't this an indictment of the process of fixing
damages at trial, making comparability review a justifiable
second-best alternative? Is the failure of comparability
review's utilitarian foundation tantamount to a conclusion
that intangible losses cannot be legitimately evaluated at
all?
In fact, the call for comparability makes two errors.
First, it demands the impossible, i.e., that items which are
in principle unique be compared on equal terms. Thus, it
creates the problem of incommensurability. Then, it seeks
to solve that problem, self-inflicted though it is, by the
fallacy of over-reduction. To avoid the puzzle of
incomparability, interior personal states of distinct
individuals are reduced to something else, thereby dropping
out of the calculus features of uniqueness tied to each
victim's personal identity. Second, comparability review
conflates the process of comparison with the notion of
evaluation, by assuming that if options cannot be equated
by reference to a common standard, it is not possible to
rationally judge how to treat them. But the notion that
some things cannot be compared in virtue of the same
criterion does not entail that rational evaluation is
impossible. For Raz, all that is required is that justified
reasons can be given for the choice that is made. Ecological
and narrative rationality suggest that those reasons might
come from the use of heuristics in the context of each
victim's narrative account of the nature and extent of
intangible harm. To see how this might work it is
instructive to review the very purpose of resolving claims by
trial and the unique evaluative opportunities that the trial
process brings.
In one of the most successful casebooks on civil
procedure, the authors describe the justification for civil
litigation as follows:
The reasons for the prevalence of our adversary system are
manifold, but four postulates are certainly among the most
important: (1) A truer decision is reached as a result of a contest
directed by interested parties. (2) The parties, who after all are the
ones principally interested in the controversy's resolution, should
bear the major burden of the time and energy required. (3)
Although impartial investigation may be better when no final
decision need be reached, setting up sides makes easier the type of
yes-or-no decision that is thought to be necessary in a lawsuit. (4)
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Since resort to law has replaced the resort to force that
characterized primitive ages, the atavistic instinct to do battle is
better satisfied by a means of settling disputes that is very much
in the hands of the parties.
There are several important assumptions here that
deserve to be stressed. The trial process assumes that facts
and issues are to be brought into the legal system at the
ground level by the interested parties, meaning those
persons whose individual claims and defenses are actually
at stake. In addition, while the adversary system is
intended to produce a "truer" system of conflict resolution
than processes like trial by combat, its ultimate goal is to
produce a legitimate decision procedure, a mechanism for
deciding contested claims on often incomplete or imperfect
information. The legitimacy of this decision procedure, its
ability to substitute for our "atavistic" instincts and to solve
our problems in light of the difficulty of achieving an
absolutely true result in any dispute, depends on the
personal initiative, and control (within limits) of the
litigants themselves. There are two well-accepted principles
of civil litigation that illuminate these ideas clearly.
First, the burden of proof that is acceptable in most
forms of civil trial underscores that perfection is not the
most important goal. In most jurisdictions the plaintiff need
only carry the burden of proof on liability by a mere
preponderance of the evidence.348 For purposes of argument,
assume that this standard translates roughly into the
notion that a plaintiff wins a case on liability even where
only 51% of the evidence supports her or his account of
what has occurred. This means that we are willing to
tolerate a margin of error in regard to the fundamental
question of legal responsibility of forty-nine percent in the
vast majority of civil cases. Secondly, the principle of
preclusion, which treats the normative value of finality as
more important than absolute truth, underscores that
perfection in determining winners and losers is not
necessary. Once one has had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate a claim to conclusion, absent extraordinary
circumstances, one may not attack the judgment or reopen
347. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS 2
(8th ed. 2001).
348. See, e.g., KEVIN F. OMALLEY ET AL., 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS Ch. 4, app. E (5th ed. 2000).
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the litigation, even if one could prove that the result was
wrong.
These features of the trial process reveal that the
activity of rational evaluation takes place within a
pragmatic framework where the perfect is not an enemy of
the good. But when attention turns from the question of
liability to damages, particularly damages for intangible
losses, perfection does become a barrier that obscures the
real evaluative power of the trial process. One way to
uncover how these opportunities are lost in comparability
review is to evaluate why appellate courts are supposed to
give deference to the factual results of the trials, rather
than to substitute their own judgment on such matters.
Remember that the amount of nonpecuniary damages,
as the court in Hatahley II took such pains to stress, is to be
evaluated as a personal and individual matter. Remember
also that the trier of fact, be it judge or jury, has the only
opportunity to directly witness the testimonial facts that
the litigants bring forward. It is at trial, and only at trial,
that there is an immediate ability to judge the demeanor,
credibility, and competency of witnesses. Second, it is only
at trial that the full narrative account of each party's view
of events unfolds. This is particularly important for
intangible losses, for it is only at trial that the victim can
explain the full impact of a wrong on her or his personal
identity, or on important goals the victim had been
pursuing. Moreover, it bears critically on the question of
how nonpecuniary harms are to be rationally evaluated, if
they are so personal and unique. This is because the
narrative form of proof which is inherent in the testimony
of plaintiff and defendant, and their attendant supplemen-
tary witnesses, opens a logical space for the process of
narrative rationality to take place.
Raz's work suggests that all rationality requires is that
justifiable reasons can be given for a course of conduct or
choice, not that the reasons emanate from the same
measure. For Raz, rational reason-giving is bound up in
what promotes one's well-being, and well-being is a multi-
dimensional, context dependent concept that goes beyond
preference ranking. This idea can be applied to what
happens at trial when damages for nonpecuniary losses are
fixed, for all the trier of fact must do is establish a
reasonable basis for the amount assessed. How is this
accomplished, if intangible harms can involve the kind of
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complex insults to personal identity and goal-directed
behavior that I have claimed? It is here that we must
confront the notion that it is possible to comprehend the
impact of a wrong on a person's whole life without that
impact being the same for every person. It is possible to
make sense of another human being's claim of unique harm,
without doing violence to the fact that it is unique and to
redress it pragmatically with a monetary award. This is
nothing more or less than the claim that I can understand
you, without actually being you. That this is possible is
borne out by a variety of sources: our very ability to
communicate through a common language, and our ability
to understand stories which posit radically different life
circumstances than our own. Consider again the
comprehensibility of Kafka's The Metamorphosis, works in
cognitive psychology that demonstrate how we use heuristic
devices to make rationally justifiable decisions, and so
forth.
Trial determinations of damages for intangible losses
generally meet the criteria of results produced through a
legitimate, if less than perfect, decision process. One way to
understand the real significance of the behavioral law and
economics critique of that process is to consider this: if in
the last generation, power has shifted from juries to trial
judges,349 in the immediate era a more unsettling change is
at work. It is a transfer of power from the trial process to
the appellate tribunal. This relocation of judicial power has
significant negative effects on the legitimacy of the tort
system itself, if not for civil litigation in general.
IV. SUMMARY
Comparability review allows federal appellate tribunals
to reconstitute themselves into legislators or technocrats
under the guise of promoting fairness, efficiency, and
legitimacy. But, none of these goals are actually promoted
by the practice. Instead, tort reform is being undertaken
through procedural means. In view of democratic principles,
the most troubling aspect of this phenomenon is its stealthy
character. Because requiring that damages for intangible
losses be compared across cases affects the standard of
349. See generally Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982).
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review-a most arcane topic for the average person-the
changes it might bring are happening below the radar
screen of the normal democratic process, where conflicts
between competing norms should be resolved. It is time for
the public to reclaim its prerogatives to establish the values
that the legal system should serve. Comparability review
should be rejected as foundationally incoherent, unjust,
inefficient, and inconsistent with the political theory
underpinning the American system of governance.
